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Abstract
We investigate modal logics of high probability having two unary modal operators: an op-
erator K expressing probabilistic certainty and an operator B expressing probability exceeding
a fixed rational threshold c ≥ 12 . Identifying knowledge with the former and belief with the
latter, we may think of c as the agent’s betting threshold, which leads to the motto “belief is
willingness to bet.” The logic KB.5 for c = 12 has an S5 K modality along with a sub-normal
B modality that extends the minimal modal logic EMND45 by way of four schemes relating
K and B, one of which is a complex scheme arising out of a theorem due to Scott. Lenzen was
the first to use Scott’s theorem to show that a version of this logic is sound and complete for the
probability interpretation. We reformulate Lenzen’s results and present them here in a mod-
ern and accessible form. In addition, we introduce a new epistemic neighborhood semantics
that will be more familiar to modern modal logicians. Using Scott’s theorem, we provide the
Lenzen-derivative properties that must be imposed on finite epistemic neighborhood models
so as to guarantee the existence of a probability measure respecting the neighborhood func-
tion in the appropriate way for threshold c = 12 . This yields a link between probabilistic and
modal neighborhood semantics that we hope will be of use in future work on modal logics of
qualitative probability. We leave open the question of which properties must be imposed on fi-
nite epistemic neighborhood models so as to guarantee existence of an appropriate probability
measure for thresholds c 6= 12 .
1 Introduction
De Finetti [dF51, dF37] proposed the following axiomatization of qualitative probabilistic com-
parison (presented here based on [Sco64]): for sets X , Y , and Z coming from the powerset ℘(W )
of a nonempty finite set W , we have
1. W  ∅,
2. ∅  X ,
3. X  Y or Y  X ,
∗Funded by an Innovational Research Incentives Scheme Veni grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scien-
tific Research (NWO).
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4. X  Y  Z implies X  Z, and
5. X  Y if and only if X ∪ Z  Y ∪ Z for Z disjoint from X and Y .
De Finetti conjectured that any binary relation  on ℘(W ) that satisfies these conditions is real-
izable by a probability measure P on ℘(W ), which means that we have X  Y if and only if
P (X) ≤ P (Y ). While every probability measure realizing a binary relation  on ℘(W ) satisfies
de Finetti’s conditions, these conditions do not in general guarantee the existence of a realizing
probability measure: it was shown by Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg [KPS59] (presented here as in
[Seg71]) that for W = {a, b, c, d, e}, the relations
{c} ≺ {a, b}, {b, d} ≺ {a, c},
{a, e} ≺ {b, c}, {a, b, c} ≺ {d, e}
may be extended to a binary relation over ℘(W ) that satisfies de Finetti’s conditions and yet has
no realizing probability measure. Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg (“KPS”) also determined what was
missing from de Finetti’s axiomatization; Scott [Sco64] later presented the KPS conditions in a
linear algebraic form.
Theorem 1.1 ([Sco64, Theorem 4.1] reformulated with ℘(W ) instead of a general Boolean alge-
bra). Let W be a nonempty finite set. Given X ∈ ℘(W ), let ι : W → {0, 1} be the characteristic
function of X (i.e., ι(X)(w) = 1 if w ∈ X , and ι(X)(w) = 0 if w /∈ X). Construe functions
x : W → R as vectors: x(w) indicates the real-number value of vector x at coordinate w. Ad-
dition and negation of these vectors is taken component-wise: (x + y)(w) := x(w) + y(w) and
(−x)(w) := −(x(w)). A binary relation  on ℘(W ) is realizable by a probability measure if and
only if it satisfies each of the following: for each m ∈ Z+ and X, Y,X1, . . . , Xm, Y1, . . . , Ym ∈
℘(W ), we have
1. ∅ ≺ W ;
2. ∅  X;
3. X  Y or Y  X; and
4. if Xi  Yi for each i ≤ m and
∑m
i=1 ι(Xi) =
∑m
j=1 ι(Yj), then Yj  Xj for each j ≤ m.
Scott’s fourth condition is the most difficult. The algebraic component∑m
i=1 ι(Xi) =
∑m
j=1 ι(Yj) (1)
of this condition says: for each coordinate w ∈ W , the number of Xi’s that contain w is equal to
the number of Yj’s that contain w. Intuitively, Scott’s forth condition tells us that if two length-m
sequences of coordinate sets are related component-wise by the relation “is no more probable than”
and the occurrence multiplicity of any given world is the same in each of the sequences, then the
sets are also related component-wise by the relation “has the same probability.”
Using Scott’s theorem to prove completeness, Segerberg [Seg71] studied a modal logic of qual-
itative probability. Segerberg’s logic has a binary operator  expressing qualitative probabilistic
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comparison and a unary operator ✷ expressing necessity. Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨r75] considered a simpli-
fied version of Segerberg’s logic that, among other differences, eliminated the necessity operator
in lieu of the abbreviation ✷ϕ := (1  ϕ), which has the semantic meaning that ϕ has proba-
bility 1 (and implies that ϕ is true at all outcomes with nonzero probability). Both Ga¨rdenfors
and Segerberg express the algebraic component (1) of Scott’s fourth condition using Segerberg’s
notation
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕmEψ1, . . . , ψm) ,
which we sometimes shorten to (ϕiEψi)mi=1. This expression abbreviates the formula
✷(F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm) ,
where each Fi is the disjunction of all conjunctions
d1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ dmϕm ∧ e1ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ emψm∧
satisfying the property that exactly i of the dk’s are the empty string, exactly i of the ek’s are the
empty string, and the rest of the dk’s and ek’s are the negation sign ¬. Intuitively, Fi says that i of
the ϕk’s are true and i of the ψk’s are true; F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm says that the number of true ϕk’s is the
same as the number of true ψk’s; and (ϕiEψi)mi=1 := ✷(F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm) says that at every outcome
with nonzero probability, the number of true ϕk’s is the same as the number of true ψk’s. Using
this notation, it is possible to express the fourth condition of Scott’s theorem and thereby obtain
completeness for the probabilistic interpretation.
In the present paper, we follow this tradition of studying probability from a qualitative (i.e.,
non-numerical) point of view using modal logic. However, our focus shall not be on the binary
relation  of qualitative probabilistic comparison but instead on the unary notions of certainty
(i.e., having probability 1) and “high” probability (i.e., having a probability greater than some
fixed rational-number threshold c ≥ 1
2
). That is, our interest is in unary modal logics of high
probability.
For convenience in this study, we shall identify epistemic notions with probabilistic assign-
ment, which suggests a connection with subjective probability [Jef04]. In particular, we identify
knowledge with probabilistic certainty (i.e., probability 1) and belief with probability greater than
some fixed rational-number threshold c ≥ 1
2
. Therefore, instead of the unary operator ✷, we shall
use the unary operator K and assign this operator an epistemic reading: Kϕ says that the agent
knows ϕ, which means she assigns ϕ subjective probability 1. We shall use the unary modal opera-
tor B to express belief: Bϕ says that the agent believes ϕ, which means she assigns ϕ a subjective
probability exceeding the threshold c (which will always be a fixed value within a given context
or theory). Though our readings of these formulas are epistemic and doxastic, we stress that our
technical results are independent of this reading, so someone who disagrees with subjective proba-
bility or our epistemic/doxastic readings is encouraged to think of our work purely in terms of high
probability: Kϕ says P (ϕ) = 1, and Bϕ says P (ϕ) > c for some fixed c ∈ [1
2
, 1)∩Q. That is, the
technical results of our work are in no way dependent on our use of epistemic/doxastic notions or
on the philosophy of subjective probability.
Lenzen [Len03, Len80] is to our knowledge the first to consider a modal logic of high probabil-
ity for the threshold c = 1
2
. Actually, his perspective is slightly different than the one we adopt here.
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First, his reading of formulas is different (though not in any deep way): he identifies “the agent is
convinced of ϕ” with P (ϕ) = 1 and “ψ is believed” by P (ψ) > 1
2
. More substantially, Lenzen’s
conviction (German: ¨Uberzeuging) does not imply truth. Technically, this amounts to permitting
the possibility that there are outcomes having probability zero. For reasons of personal preference,
we forbid this in our study here, though this difference is non-essential, as it is completely triv-
ial from the technical perspective to change our setting to allow zero-probability outcomes or to
change Lenzen’s setting to forbid them. Therefore, we credit Lenzen’s work [Len80] as the first
to provide a proof of probabilistic completeness for c = 1
2
. As with Segerberg’s and Ga¨rdenfors’
probabilistic completeness results, Lenzen’s proof made crucial use of Scott’s work.
In more recent work, Herzig [Her03] considered a logic of belief and action in which belief in
ϕ is identified with P (ϕ) > P (¬ϕ). This is equivalent to Lenzen’s notion, though Herzig does
not study completeness. Another recent work by Kyberg and Teng [KT12] investigated a notion of
“acceptance” in which ϕ is accepted whenever the probability of ¬ϕ is at most some small ǫ. This
gives rise to the minimal modal logic EMN, which is different than Lenzen’s logic.
We herein consider belief a` la Lenzen not only for the case c = 1
2
but also for the case c > 1
2
.
As it turns out, the logics for these cases are different, though our focus will be on the logic for
c = 1
2
because this is the only threshold for which a probability completeness result is known. In
particular, probability completeness for c > 1
2
is still open. Thresholds c < 1
2
permit simultaneous
belief of ϕ and ¬ϕ while avoiding belief of any self-contradictory sentence such as the proposi-
tional constant ⊥ for falsehood. This might suggest some connection with paraconsistent logic.
However, we leave these logics of low probability for future work, though we shall say a few words
more about them later in this paper.
In Section 2, we identify a Kripke-style semantics for probability logic similar to [EoS14,
Hal03] (and no doubt to many others). We require that all worlds are probabilistically possible but
not necessarily epistemically so, and we provide some examples of how this semantics works. In
particular, we demonstrate that our requirement is not problematic: world v can be made to have
probability zero relative to world w if we cut the epistemic accessibility relation between these
worlds.
In Section 3, we define our modal notions of certain knowledge and of belief exceeding thresh-
old c, explain the motto “belief is willingness to bet,” and prove a number of properties of certain
knowledge and this “betting” belief. For instance, we show that knowledge is S5 and belief is
not normal. We show a number of other threshold-specific properties of betting belief as well. In
particular, we see that the belief modality extends the minimal modal logic EMND45 + ¬B⊥ by
way of certain schemes relating knowledge and belief.
We then introduce a formal modal language in Section 4, relate this language to the proba-
bilistic notions of belief and knowledge, and introduce an epistemic neighborhood semantics for
the language. We study the relationship between the neighborhood and probabilistic semantics.
In particular, we introduce a notion of “agreement” between epistemic probability models and
epistemic neighborhood models, the key component of which is this: an event X is a neighbor-
hood of a world w if and only if the probability measure Pw at w satisfies Pw(X) > c. We use
one of Scott’s theorems to prove that epistemic neighborhood models satisfying certain properties
give rise to agreeing epistemic probability models for the threshold c = 1
2
. This result we credit
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to Lenzen; however, we prove this result anew in a modern, streamlined form that we hope will
make it more accessible. The main remaining open problem is to prove the analogous result for
thresholds c 6= 1
2
(i.e., find the additional sufficient conditions on epistemic neighborhood models
we need to impose so as to guarantee the existence of an agreeing epistemic probability model for
threshold c 6= 1
2
). Finally, we prove that epistemic probability models always give rise to agreeing
epistemic neighborhood models.
In Section 5, we introduce a basic modal theory KB that is probabilistically sound. We adapt
an example due to Walley and Fine [WF79] that shows KB is probabilistically incomplete. This
leads us to add additional principles to KB, thereby producing the modal theory KB.5, our name
for our modern reformulation of Lenzen’s modal theory of knowledge and belief (or, in Lenzen’s
terminology, his theory of “acceptance” and belief). Using the results from Section 4, we prove
that this logic is sound and complete for epistemic probability models using threshold c = 1
2
.
Regarding the semantics based on our epistemic neighborhood models, we prove that KB is sound
and complete for the full class of these models and that KB.5 is sound and complete for the smaller
class that satisfies the additional Lenzen-derivative properties needed to guarantee the existence of
an agreeing probability measure for threshold c = 1
2
.
Stated in an analogy: KB is to de Finetti’s axiomatization as KB.5 is to the KPS/Scott axioma-
tization. However, do not be misled: de Finetti, KPS, and Scott considered qualitative probabilistic
comparison, which is a binary notion based on a binary operator . See also [HI13] for a revival
of this tradition. We, on the other hand, consider high probability, which is a unary notion based
on unary operators we denote as K and B.
Another version of our main open question can be restated in the following syntactic form:
given a threshold c 6= 1
2
, find the additional principles that must be added to our probabilistically
sound but incomplete base logic KB in order to obtain a probabilistically sound and complete
logic for threshold c. In our conclusion, we present some additional sound principles that might
come up in this work, but we have not been able to find the probabilistically sound and complete
axiomatization for thresholds c 6= 1
2
.
Given the link between epistemic neighborhood models and epistemic probability models, our
results may be viewed as a contribution to the study connecting two schools of rational decision
making: the probabilist (e.g., [Ko¨r08]) and the AI-based (e.g., [KT12]). We also hope that it will
be of some use in future work on qualitative probability.
2 Epistemic Probability Models
Definition 2.1. We fix a set P of propositional letters. An epistemic probability model is a structure
M = (W,R, V, P ) satisfying the following.
• (W,R, V ) is a finite single-agent S5 Kripke model:
– W is a finite nonempty set of “worlds” or “outcomes.” An event is a set X ⊆ W of
worlds. When convenient, we identify a world w with the singleton event {w}.
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– R ⊆W ×W is an equivalence relation R on W . We let
[w] := {v ∈ W | wRv}
denote the equivalence class of world w. This is the set of worlds that agent cannot
distinguish from w.
– V : W → ℘(P) assigns a set V (w) of propositional letters to each world w ∈ W .
• P : ℘(W ) → [0, 1] is a probability measure over the finite algebra ℘(W ) satisfying the
property of full support: P (w) 6= 0 for each w ∈ W .
A pointed epistemic probability model is a pair (M, w) consisting of an epistemic probability
model M = (W,R, V, P ) and world w ∈ W called the point.
The agent’s uncertainty as to which world is the actual world is given by the equivalence rela-
tion R. If w is the actual world, then the probability the agent assigns to an event X at w is given
by
Pw(X) :=
P (X ∩ [w])
P ([w])
. (2)
In words: the probability the agent assigns to event X at world w is the probability she assigns to
X conditional on her knowledge at w. Slogan: subjective probability is always conditioned, and
the most general condition is given by the knowledge of the agent. This makes sense because the
right side of (2) is just P (X|[w]), the probability of X conditional on [w]. Note that Pw(X) is
always well-defined: we have w ∈ [w] by the reflexivity of R and hence 0 < P (w) ≤ P ([w]) by
full support, so the denominator on the right side of (2) is nonzero.
Example 2.2 (Horse racing). Three horses compete in a race. For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, horse hi
wins the race in world wi. The agent can distinguish between these three possibilities, and she
assigns the horses winning chances of 3:2:1. We represent this situation in the form of an epistemic
probability model M2.2 pictured as follows:
h1
w1
h2
w2
h3
w3
P = {w1 :
3
6
, w2 :
2
6
, w3 :
1
6
}
M2.2
When we picture epistemic probability models, the arrows of the agent are to be closed un-
der reflexivity and transitivity. With this convention in place, it is not difficult to verify that
Pw1({w1, w3}) =
2
3
; that is, at w1, the assigns probability 23 to the event that the winner is horse 1
or horse 3.
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The property of full support says that each world is probabilistically possible. Therefore, in
order to represent a situation in which the agent is certain that horse 3 can never win, we simply
make the h3-worlds inaccessible via R.
Example 2.3 (Certainty of impossibility). We modify Example 2.2 by eliminating the arrow be-
tween worlds w2 and w3.
h1
w1
h2
w2
h3
w3
P = {w1 :
3
6
, w2 :
2
6
, w3 :
1
6
}
M2.3
At world w1 in this picture, there is no accessible world at which horse 3 wins. Therefore, at world
w1, the agent assigns probability 0 to the event that horse 3 wins: Pw1(w3) = 0.
We define a language L for reasoning about epistemic probability models.
Definition 2.4. The language L of (single-agent) probability logic is defined by the following
grammar.
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | t ≥ 0
t ::= q | q · P (ϕ) | t+ t
p ∈ P, q ∈ Q
We adopt the usual abbreviations for Boolean connectives. We define the relational symbols≤, >,
<, and = in terms of ≥ as usual. For example, t = s abbreviates (t ≥ s) ∧ (s ≥ t). We also use
the obvious abbreviations for writing linear inequalities. For example, P (p) ≤ 1 − q abbreviates
1 + (−q) + (−1) · P (p) ≥ 0.
Definition 2.5. LetM = (W,R, V, P ) be an epistemic probability model. We define a binary truth
relation |=p between a pointed epistemic probability model (M, w) and L-formulas as follows.
M, w |=p ⊤
M, w |=p p iff p ∈ V (w)
M, w |=p ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|=p ϕ
M, w |=p ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |=p ϕ and M, w |=p ψ
M, w |=p t ≥ 0 iff JtKw ≥ 0
JϕKp := {u ∈ W | M, u |=p ϕ}
Pw(X) :=
P (X ∩ [w])
P ([w])
JqKw := q
Jq · P (ϕ)Kw := q · Pw(JϕKp)
Jt + t′Kw := JtKw + Jt
′Kw
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Validity of ϕ ∈ L in epistemic probability model M, written M |=p ϕ, means that M, w |=p ϕ
for each world w ∈ W . Validity of ϕ ∈ L, written |=p ϕ, means that M |=p ϕ for each epistemic
probability model M.
3 Certainty and Belief
[Eij13] formulates and proves a “certainty theorem” relating certainty in epistemic probability
models to knowledge in a version of these models in which the probabilistic information is re-
moved. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Knowledge as Certainty). We adopt the following abbreviations.
• Kϕ abbreviates P (ϕ) = 1.
We read Kϕ as “the agent knows ϕ.”
• Kˇϕ abbreviates ¬K¬ϕ.
We read Kˇϕ as “ϕ is consistent with the agent’s knowledge.”
Theorem 3.2 ([Eij13]). K is an S5 modal operator:
1. |=p ϕ for each L-instance ϕ of a scheme of classical propositional logic.
Axioms of classical propositional logic are valid.
2. |=p K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ)
Knowledge is closed under logical consequence.
3. |=p Kϕ→ ϕ
Knowledge is veridical.
4. |=p Kϕ→ KKϕ
Knowledge is positive introspective: it is known what is known.
5. |=p ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ
Knowledge is negative introspective: it is known what is not known.
6. |=p ϕ implies |=p Kϕ
All validities are known.
7. |=p ϕ→ ψ and |=p ϕ together imply |=p ψ.
Validities are closed under the rule of Modus Ponens.
We define belief in a proposition ϕ as willingness to take bets on ϕ with the odds being better
than some rational number c ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q. This leads to a number of degrees of belief, one for
each threshold c.
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Definition 3.3 (Belief as Willingness to Bet). Fix a threshold c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q.
• Bcϕ abbreviates P (ϕ) > c.
We read Bcϕ as “the agent believes ϕ with threshold c.”
• Bˇcϕ abbreviates ¬Bc¬ϕ.
We read Bˇϕ as “ϕ is consistent with the agent’s threshold-c beliefs.”
If the threshold c is omitted (either in the notations Bcϕ and Bˇcϕ or in the informal readings of
these notations), it is assumed that c = 1
2
.
This notion of belief comes from subjective probability [Jef04]. In particular, fix a threshold
c = p/q ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q. Suppose that the agent believes ϕ with threshold c = p/q; that is, P (ϕ) >
p/q. If the agent wagers p dollars for a chance to win q dollars on a bet that ϕ is true, then she
expects her net winnings to be
[(q − p) · P (ϕ)]− [p · (1− P (ϕ))] = q · P (ϕ)− p
dollars on this bet. This is a positive number of dollars if and only if q · P (ϕ) > p. But notice that
the latter is guaranteed by the assumption P (ϕ) > p/q. Therefore, it is rational for the agent to
take this bet. Said in the parlance of the subjective probability literature: “If the agent stakes p to
win q in a bet on ϕ, then her winning expectation is positive in case she believes ϕ with threshold
c = p/q.” Or in a short motto: “Belief is willingness to bet.”
Remark 3.4. Belief based on threshold c = 0 or c = 1 is trivial to express in terms of negation, K,
and falsehood⊥. So we do not consider these thresholds here. Beliefs based on low-thresholds c ∈
(0, 1
2
) ∩ Q have unintuitive and unusual features. First, low-threshold beliefs unintuitively permit
inconsistency of the kind that an agent can believe both ϕ and ¬ϕ while avoiding inconsistency
of the kind that the agent can believe a self-contradictory formula such as ⊥. (This suggests some
connection with paraconsistent logic.) Second, the dual of a low-threshold belief implies the belief
at that threshold (i.e., Bˇcϕ→ Bcϕ), which is unusual if we assign the usual “consistency” reading
to dual operators (i.e., “ϕ is consistent with the agent’s beliefs implies ϕ is believed” is unusual).
Since low-threshold c ∈ (0, 1
2
) ∩ Q beliefs have these unintuitive and unusual features, we leave
their study for future work, focusing instead on thresholds c ∈ [1
2
, 1) ∩Q.
The following lemma provides a useful characterization of the dual Bˇcϕ.
Lemma 3.5. Let M = (W,R, V, P ) be an epistemic probability model.
1. M, w |=p Bˇcϕ iff M, w |=p P (ϕ) ≥ 1− c.
2. M, w |=p Bˇ
1
2ϕ iff M, w |=p P (ϕ) ≥ 12 .
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Proof. For Item 1, we have the following:
M, w |=p Bˇcϕ
iff M, w |=p ¬Bc¬ϕ by definition of Bˇcϕ
iff Pw(J¬ϕKp) 6> c by definition of Bcϕ and |=p
iff Pw(J¬ϕKp) ≤ c since Q is totally ordered
iff Pw(JϕKp) ≥ 1− c since J¬ϕKp = W − JϕKp
For Item 2, apply Item 1 with c = 1
2
.
We now consider a simple example.
Example 3.6 (Non-normality). In this variation, all horses have equal chances of winning and the
agent knows this.
h1
w1
h2
w2
h3
w3
P = {w1 :
1
3
, w2 :
1
3
, w3 :
1
3
}
M3.6
Recalling that an omitted threshold c is implicitly assumed to be 1
2
, the following are readily veri-
fied.
1. M3.6 |=p B(h1 ∨ h2 ∨ h3).
The agent believes the winning horse is among the three.
(The agent is willing to bet that the winning horse is among the three.)
2. M3.6 |=p B(h1 ∨ h2) ∧ B(h1 ∨ h3) ∧B(h2 ∨ h3).
The agent believes the winning horse is among any two.
(The agent is willing to bet that the winning horse is among any two.)
3. M3.6 |=p Ba¬h1 ∧ Ba¬h2 ∧Ba¬h3.
The agent believes the winning horse is not any particular one.
(The agent is willing to bet that the winning horse is not any particular one.)
4. M3.6 |=p ¬B(¬h1 ∧ ¬h2).
The agent does not believe that both horses 1 and 2 do not win.
(The agent is not willing to bet that both horses 1 and 2 do not win.)
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It follows from Items 3 and 4 of Example 3.6 that the present notion of belief is not closed
under conjunction. This is discussed as part of the literature on the “Lottery Paradox” [Kyb61].1
However, there is no reason in general that it is paradoxical to assign a conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ a lower
probability than either of its conjunctions. Indeed, if ϕ and ψ are independent, then the probability
of their conjunction equals the product of their probabilities, so unless one of ϕ or ψ is certain
or impossible, the probability of ϕ ∧ ψ will be less than the probability of ϕ and less than the
probability of ψ.
We set aside philosophical arguments for or against closure of belief under conjunction and
instead turn our attention to the study of the properties of the present notion of belief. One of
these is a complicated but useful property due to Scott [Sco64] that makes use of notation due to
Segerberg [Seg71].
Definition 3.7 (Segerberg notation; [Seg71]). Fix a positive integerm ∈ Z+ and formulasϕ1, . . . , ϕm
and ψ1, . . . , ψm. The expression
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕmIψ1, . . . , ψm) (3)
abbreviates the formula
K(F0 ∨ F1 ∨ F2 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm) ,
where Fi is the disjunction of all conjunctions
d1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ dmϕm ∧ e1ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ emψm
satisfying the property that exactly i of the dk’s are the empty string, at least i of the ek’s are the
empty string, and the rest of the dk’s and ek’s are the negation sign ¬. We may write (ϕiIψi)mi=1 as
an abbreviation for (3). Finally, let
(ϕiEψi)
m
i=1 abbreviate (ϕiIψi)mi=1 ∧ (ψiIϕi)mi=1 .
We also allow the use of E in a notation similar to (3).
The formula (ϕiIψi)mi=1 says that the agent knows that the number of true ϕi’s is less than or
equal to the number of true ψi’s. Put another way, (ϕiIψi)mi=1 is true if and only if every one of
the agent’s epistemically accessible worlds satisfies at least as many ψi’s as ϕi’s. The formula
(ϕiEψi)mi=1 says that every one of the agent’s epistemically accessible worlds satisfies exactly as
many ψi’s as ϕi’s.
Definition 3.8 (Scott scheme; [Sco64]). We define the following scheme:
[(ϕiIψi)mi=1 ∧ B
cϕ1 ∧
∧m
i=2 Bˇ
cϕi]→
∨m
i=1B
cψi (Scott)
If m = 1, then
∧m
i=2 Bˇ
cϕi is ⊤. Note that (Scott) is meant to encompass the indicated scheme for
each positive integer m ∈ Z+.
1The usual formulation of the Lottery Paradox: it is paradoxical for an agent to believe that one of n lottery tickets
will be a winner (i.e., “some ticket is a winner”) without believing of any particular ticket that it is the winner (i.e.,
“for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ticket i is not a winner”).
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(Scott) says that if the agent knows the number of true ϕi’s is less than or equal to the number
of true ψi’s, she believes ϕ1 with threshold c, and the remaining ϕi’s are each consistent with
her threshold-c beliefs, then she believes one of the ψi’s with threshold c. Adapting a proof of
Segerberg [Seg71], we show that belief with threshold c = 1
2
satisfies (Scott).
We report this result along with a number of other properties in the following proposition.
Theorem 3.9 (Properties of Belief). For c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q, we have:
1. 6|=p Bc(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bcϕ→ Bcψ).
Belief is not closed under logical consequence.
(So Bc is not a normal modal operator.)
2. 6|=p Bcϕ→ ϕ.
Belief is not veridical.
3. |=p Kϕ→ Bcϕ.
What is known is believed.
4. |=p ¬Bc⊥.
The propositional constant ⊥ for falsehood is not believed.
5. |=p Bc⊤.
The propositional constant ⊤ for truth is believed.
6. |=p Bcϕ→ KBcϕ.
What is believed is known to be believed.
7. |=p ¬Bcϕ→ K¬Bcϕ.
What is not believed is known to be not believed.
8. |=p K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bcϕ→ Bcψ).
Belief is closed under known logical consequence.
9. If c ∈ [1
2
, 1), then |=p Bcϕ→ Bˇcϕ.
High-threshold belief is consistent: belief in ϕ implies disbelief in ¬ϕ.
10. |=p Bˇ
1
2ϕ ∧ Kˇ(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)→ B
1
2 (ϕ ∨ ψ).
For mid-threshold belief, if ϕ is consistent with the agent’s beliefs and ¬ϕ ∧ ψ is consistent
with her knowledge, then she believes ϕ ∨ ψ.
11. |=p [(ϕiIψi)mi=1 ∧ B
1
2ϕ1 ∧
∧m
i=2 Bˇ
1
2ϕi]→
∨m
i=1B
1
2ψi.
Mid-threshold belief satisfies (Scott).
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Proof. We consider each item in turn.
1. Given c ∈ (0, 1)∩Q and integers p and q such that p/q = c, we defineM as the modification
of the model M3.6 of Example 3.6 obtained by changing P as follows:
P :=
{
w1 :
q − p
2q
, w2 :
p
q
, w3 :
q − p
2q
}
.
Since 0 < p < q, it follows that
Pw1(J¬h1 → h2Kp) = Pw1({w1, w2}) =
q + p
2q
>
2p
2q
=
p
q
,
Pw1(J¬h1Kp) = Pw1({w2, w3}) =
q + p
2q
>
2p
2q
=
p
q
, and
Pw1(Jh2Kp) = Pw1(w2) =
p
q
.
Therefore, we have
M, w1 |=p B
c(¬h1 → h2) ∧B
c¬h1 ∧ ¬B
ch2 .
2. For M defined in the proof of Item 1, we have
M, w1 |=p h1 ∧B
c¬h1 .
3. M, w |=p Kϕ implies Pw(JϕKp) = 1 > c. Hence M, w |=p Bcϕ.
4. Pw(J⊥Kp) = 0 < c. Hence M, w |= ¬Bc⊥.
5. Pw(J⊤Kp) = 1 > c. Hence M, w |=p Bc⊤.
6. M, w |=p Bcϕ implies Pw(JϕKp) > c. To show that M, w |=p KBcϕ, we must prove that
Pw(JB
cϕKp) =
P (JBcϕKp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
= 1 .
To show this, we prove that JBcϕKp ∩ [w] = [w]. So choose u ∈ [w]. Since R is an
equivalence relation, we have
Pu(JϕKp) =
P (JϕKp ∩ [u])
P ([u])
=
P (JϕKp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
= Pw(JϕKp) > c ,
which implies u ∈ JBcϕKp. The result follows.
7. The argument is similar to that for Item 6, though we note that M, w |=p ¬Bcϕ implies
Pw(JϕKp) ≤ c.
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8. We assume thatM, w |=p K(ϕ→ ψ) andM, w |=p Bcϕ. This means thatPw(Jϕ→ ψKp) =
1 and Pw(JϕKp) > c. But then it follows that Pw(JψKp) > c as well, which is what it means
to have M, w |=p Bcψ.
9. Assume c ∈ [1
2
, 1)∩Q andM, w |=p Bcϕ. Then Pw(JϕKp) > c ≥ 1−c. So Pw(JϕKp) ≥ 1−c.
The result therefore follows by Lemma 3.5.
10. We prove something more general. Assume c ∈ (0, 1
2
] ∩ Q and M, w |=p Bˇcϕ. By
Lemma 3.5, it follows that Pw(JϕKp) ≥ c. Let us assume further thatM, w |=p Kˇ(¬ϕ ∧ ψ).
This means
1 6= Pw(J¬(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)Kp) =
P (J¬(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)Kp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
,
which implies there exists v ∈ J¬ϕ ∧ ψKp ∩ [w]. Since P (v) > 0 by full support, it follows
that
Pw(Jϕ ∨ ψKp) =
P (Jϕ ∨ ψKp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
=
P (JϕKp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
+
P (J¬ϕ ∧ ψKp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
≥
P (JϕKp ∩ [w])
P ([w])
+
P (v)
P ([w])
= Pw(JϕKp) +
P (v)
P ([w])
≥ c+
P (v)
P ([w])
> c .
That is, M, w |=p Bc(ϕ ∨ ψ).
11. Again, we prove something more general. We assume c ∈ (0, 1
2
] ∩Q plus the following:
M, w |=p (ϕiIψi)
m
i=1 (4)
M, w |=p B
cϕ1 (5)
M, w |=p
∧m
i=2 Bˇ
cϕi (6)
We recall the meaning of (4): for each v ∈ [w], the number of ϕi’s true at v is less than or
equal to the number of ψk’s true at v. It therefore follows from (4) that
Pw(Jϕ1Kp) + · · ·+ Pw(JϕmKp) ≤ Pw(Jψ1Kp) + · · ·+ Pw(JψmKp) . (7)
Outlining an argument due to Segerberg [Seg71, pp. 344–346], the reason for this is as
follows: we think of each world v ∈ [w] as being assigned a “weight” Pw(v). A member
Pw(JϕiKp) of the sum on the left of (7) is just a total of the weight of every v ∈ [w] that
satisfies ϕi; that is,
Pw(JϕiKp) =
∑
{Pw(v) | v ∈ JϕiKp ∩ [w]} .
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Assumption (4) tells us that for each v ∈ [w], the number of totals Pw(JϕiKp) on the left of
(7) to which v contributes its weight is less than or equal to the number of totals Pw(JψkKp)
on the right of (7) to which v contributes its weight. But then the sum of totals on the left
must be less than or equal to the sum of totals on the right. Hence (7) follows.
Having established (7), we now proceed further with the overall proof. By (5), we have
Pw(Jϕ1Kp) > c. Applying (6) and Lemma 3.5, we have Pw(ϕi) ≥ c for each i ∈ {2, . . . , m}.
Hence
Pw(Jψ1Kp) + · · ·+ Pw(JψmKp) ≥ Pw(Jϕ1Kp) + · · ·+ Pw(JϕmKp) > mc .
That is, the sum of the Pw(JψkKp)’s must exceed mc. Since each member of this m-member
sum is non-negative, it follows that at least one member must exceed c. That is, there exists
j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that Pw(JψjKp) > c. Hence M, w |=p
∨m
j=1B
cψj .
4 Epistemic Neighborhood Models
The modal formulas Kϕ and Bcϕ were taken as abbreviations in the language L of probability
logic. We wish to consider a propositional modal language that has knowledge and belief operators
as primitives.
Definition 4.1. The language LKB of (single-agent) knowledge and belief is defined by the follow-
ing grammar.
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kϕ | Bϕ
p ∈ P
We adopt the usual abbreviations for other Boolean connectives and define the dual operators
Kˇ := ¬K¬ and Bˇ := ¬B¬. Finally, the LKB-formula
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕmIψ1, . . . , ψm)
and its abbreviation (ϕiIψi)mi=1 are given as in Definition 3.7 except that all formulas are taken
from the language LKB.
Our goal will be to develop a possible worlds semantics for LKB that links with the probabilistic
setting by making the following translation truth-preserving.
Definition 4.2 (Translation). For c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q, we define c : LKB → L as follows.
⊤c := ⊤
pc := p
(¬ϕ)c := ¬ϕc
(ϕ ∧ ψ)c := ϕc ∧ ψc
(Kϕ)c := P (ϕc) = 1 (= Kϕc in L)
(Bϕ)c := P (ϕc) > c (= Bcϕc in L)
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Since we have seen that the probabilistic belief operator Bc is not a normal modal operator
(Theorem 3.9(1)), we opt for a neighborhood semantics for LKB [Che80, Ch. 7] with an epistemic
twist.
Definition 4.3. An epistemic neighborhood model is a structure
M = (W,R, V,N)
satisfying the following.
• (W,R, V ) is a finite single-agent S5 Kripke model (as in Definition 2.1). As before, we let
[w] := {v ∈ W | wRv}
denote the equivalence class of worldw. This is the set of worlds the agent cannot distinguish
from w.
• N : W → ℘(℘(W )) is a neighborhood function that assigns to each world w ∈ W a
collection N(w) of sets of worlds—each such set called a neighborhood of w—subject to
the following conditions.
(kbc) ∀X ∈ N(w) : X ⊆ [w].
(kbf) ∅ /∈ N(w).
(n) [w] ∈ N(w).
(a) ∀v ∈ [w] : N(v) = N(w).
(kbm) ∀X ⊆ Y ⊆ [w] : if X ∈ N(w), then Y ∈ N(w).
A pointed epistemic neighborhood model is a pair (M, w) consisting of an epistemic neighborhood
model M and a world w in M .
An epistemic neighborhood model is a variation of a neighborhood model that includes an
epistemic component R. Intuitively, [w] is the set of worlds the agent knows to be possible at w
and each X ∈ N(w) represents a proposition that the agent believes at w. The condition that R be
an equivalence relation ensures that knowledge is closed under logical consequence, veridical (i.e.,
only true things can be known), positive introspective (i.e., the agent knows what she knows), and
negative introspective (i.e., the agent knows what she does not know).
Property (kbc) ensures that the agent does not believe a proposition X ⊆W that she knows to
be false: if X contains a world in w′ ∈ (W − [w]) that the agent knows is not possible with respect
to the actual world w, then she knows that X cannot be the case and hence she does not believe X .
Property (kbf) ensures that no logical falsehood is believed, while Property (n) ensures that every
logical truth is believed. Property (a) ensures that X is believed if and only if it is known that X is
believed. Property (kbm) says that belief is monotonic: if an agent believes X , then she believes
all propositions Y ⊇ X that follow from X .
We now turn to the definition of truth for the language LKB.
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Definition 4.4. Let M = (W,R, V,N) be an epistemic neighborhood model. We define a binary
truth relation |=n between a pointed epistemic neighborhood model (M, w) and LKB-formulas and
a function J·KMn : LKB → ℘(W ) as follows.
JϕKMn := {v ∈ W | M, v |=n ϕ}
M, w |=n p iff p ∈ V (w)
M, w |=n ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|=n ϕ
M, w |=n ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |=n ϕ and M, w |=n ψ
M, w |=n Kϕ iff [w] ⊆ JϕKMn
M, w |=n Bϕ iff [w] ∩ JϕKMn ∈ N(w)
Validity of ϕ ∈ LKB in an epistemic neighborhood model M, written M |=n ϕ, means that
M, w |=n ϕ for each world w ∈ W . Validity of ϕ ∈ LKB, written |=n ϕ, means that M |=n ϕ
for each epistemic neighborhood model M. For a class C of epistemic neighborhood models, we
write C |=n ϕ to mean that M |=n ϕ for each M∈ C.
Intuitively, Kϕ is true at w iff ϕ holds at all worlds epistemically possible with respect to w,
and Bϕ holds at w iff the epistemically possible ϕ-worlds make up a neighborhood of w. Note
that it follows from this definition that the dual for belief Bˇϕ is true at w iff [w]∩ J¬ϕKMn /∈ N(w).
The latter says that the epistemically possible ¬ϕ-worlds do not make up a neighborhood of w.
4.1 Neighborhood and Probability Model Agreement
Epistemic neighborhood models describe agent knowledge and belief. Epistemic probability mod-
els can be used for the same purpose along the lines we have discussed above once we establish a
belief threshold c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q. This gives rise to a natural question: is there some sense in which
these two models for knowledge and belief can be seen to agree?
Definition 4.5 (Model Agreement). Let M = (W,R, V,N) be an epistemic neighborhood model.
For a threshold c ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, to say that a probability measure P : ℘(W ) → [0, 1] agrees with
M for threshold c means we have the following:
• P satisfies full support (i.e., P (w) 6= 0 for each w ∈ W ); and
• for each w ∈ W and X ⊆ [w], we have
X ∈ N(w) iff Pw(X) := P (X|[w]) > c .
To say that an epistemic probability model M′ = (W ′, R′, V ′, P ′) agrees with M for threshold c
means that (W ′, R′, V ′) = (W,R, V ) and P ′ agrees with M for threshold c. If the threshold c is
not mentioned, it is assumed that c = 1
2
.
Agreement for threshold c between an epistemic neighborhood model and an epistemic proba-
bility model makes the translation c : LKB → L (Definition 4.2) truth-preserving.
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Theorem 4.6 (Agreement). Fix c ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, an epistemic neighborhood model M, and an
epistemic probability model M′. If M and M′ agree for threshold c, then we have for each
ϕ ∈ LKB that
M, w |=n ϕ iff M′, w |=p ϕc .
Proof. Induction on the structure of ϕ ∈ LKB. The non-modal cases are obvious.
We first consider knowledge formulas. Assume M, w |=n Kψ. This means [w] ⊆ JψKMn .
Applying the induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to [w] ⊆ JψcKM′p . By full support, the latter
holds if and only if
Pw(Jψ
cKM
′
p ) =
P (JψcKM
′
p ∩ [w])
P ([w])
= 1 ,
which is what it means to have M′, w |=p P (ψc) = 1. Since P (ψc) = 1 is what is abbreviated by
(Kψ)c, the result follows.
Now we move to belief formulas. AssumeM, w |=n Bψ. This means that [w]∩JψKMn ∈ N(w).
Since M′ agrees with M, the latter holds iff Pw([w] ∩ JψcKM
′
p ) > c. But this is equivalent to
Pw(Jψ
cKM
′
p ) > c, which is what it means to have M′, w |=p P (ψc) > c. Since P (ψc) > c is what
is abbreviated by (Bψ)c, the result follows.
4.2 Probability Measures on Epistemic Neighborhood Models
In this subsection, we take up the question of agreement between epistemic probability models
and epistemic neighborhood models from the point of view of the latter: given an epistemic neigh-
borhood model and a threshold c, can we find an agreeing epistemic probability model for this
threshold? As we will see, we have a full answer only for the case c = 1
2
. The case for c 6= 1
2
is
open, though we will have some comments on this in the conclusion of the paper.
To begin, we adapt an example due to Walley and Fine [WF79] to show that not every epistemic
neighborhood model gives rise to an agreeing probability measure.
Theorem 4.7 ([WF79]). There exists an epistemic neighborhood model M that has no agreeing
probability measure for any threshold c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q.
Proof. We adapt Example 2 from [WF79, pp. 344-345] to the present setting. Fix c ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q.
Let P := {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}. Define:
X := {efg, abg, adf, bde, ace, cdg, bcf} ,
Y := {abcd, cdef, bceg, acfg, bdfg, abef, adeg} .
Notation: in the above sets, xyz denotes {x, y, z}, and wxyz denotes {w, x, y, z}. Now define
N := {X ′ | ∃X ∈ X : X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ P} .
LetM := (W,R, V,N) be defined by W := P, R := W ×W , V (w) := {w} for each w ∈ P, and
N(w) := N for each w ∈ W . It is straightforward to verify that M is an epistemic neighborhood
model and that Y ∩ N = ∅.
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Toward a contradiction, suppose there exists a probability measure P that agrees with M.
Since each letter p ∈ W occurs in exactly three of the seven members of X , we have:∑
X∈X
P (X) =
∑
p∈W
3 · P ({p}) .
Since each letter p ∈ W occurs in exactly four of the seven members of Y , we have:∑
Y ∈Y
P (Y ) =
∑
p∈W
4 · P ({p}) >
∑
X∈X
P (X) .
On the other hand, since Y ∩ N = ∅, no member of Y is a neighborhood of M and therefore it
follows by the agreement of P with M that we have P (Y ) ≤ c < P (X) for each Y ∈ Y and
X ∈ X . But then ∑
Y ∈Y
P (Y ) <
∑
X∈X
P (X) ,
and we have reached a contradiction. Conclusion: no such P exists.
Question: what are the additional restrictions on the neighborhood function that one must
impose in order to guarantee the existence of an agreeing probability measure for a given threshold
c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q? For c = 1
2
, the restrictions are known. For thresholds c 6= 1
2
, the question is open.
The restrictions needed for c = 1
2
were studied first in the form of a purely probabilistic se-
mantics (i.e., something like epistemic probability models and not something like our epistemic
neighborhood models). To our knowledge, Lenzen’s [Len80] is the first complete study of the
restrictions needed in such a purely probabilistic framework over a unary modal language similar
to LKB. The conditions Lenzen proposed are targeted to satisfy the conditions of a theorem due
to Scott, which is the key result that gives rise to a probability measure in the completeness proof
for Lenzen’s logic. Here we state the required restrictions in the language of our epistemic neigh-
borhood models. Later we will make the link with Lenzen’s axiomatic system when we consider
axiomatic theories in the language LKB targeted to our epistemic neighborhood models.
Definition 4.8 (Extra Properties for “Mid-Threshold” Models). Let M = (W,R, V,N) be an
epistemic neighborhood model. For m ∈ Z+ and sets of worlds X1, . . . , Xm and Y1, . . . , Ym, we
write
X1, . . . , XmIY1, . . . , Ym (8)
to mean that for each v ∈ W , the number of Xi’s containing v is less than or equal to the number
of Yi’s containing v. This is the semantic counterpart of the formula from Definition 3.7. We
may write (XiIYi)mi=1 as an abbreviation for (8). Also, we write (XiEYi)mi=1 to mean that both
(XiIYi)mi=1 and (YiIXi)mi=1 hold, and we allow the notation with E to be used in a form as in (8).
The following is a list of properties that M may satisfy.
(d) ∀X ∈ N(w) : [w]−X /∈ N(w).
(sc) ∀X, Y ⊆ [w]: if [w]−X /∈ N(w) and X ( Y , then Y ∈ N(w).
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(scott) ∀m ∈ Z+, ∀X1, . . . , Xm, Y1, . . . , Ym ⊆ [w] :
if X1, . . . , XmIY1, . . . , Ym and
X1 ∈ N(w) and
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , m} : [w]−Xi /∈ N(w) ,
then ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , m} : Yj ∈ N(w) .
To say an epistemic neighborhood model is mid-threshold means it satisfies (d), (sc), and (scott).
We may drop the word “epistemic” in referring to mid-threshold epistemic neighborhood models.
Pointed versions of mid-threshold neighborhood models are defined in the obvious way.
Property (d) ensures that beliefs are consistent in the sense that the agent does not believe both
X and its complement [w]−X . Property (sc) is a form of “strong commitment”: if the agent does
not believe the complement [w] − X , then she must believe any strictly weaker Y implied by X .
Property (scott) is a version of the syntactic scheme (Scott) from Definition 3.8.
Let us return to the model M from the proof of Theorem 5.5. It is easy to see that for no
Xi ∈ X do we have W −Xi ∈ N(a) = N . So, numbering the members of X as X1, . . . , X7 and
the members of Y as Y1, . . . , Y7, we see that M satisfies
(XiIYi)
7
i=1, X1 ∈ N(a), and ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , 7} : W −Xi /∈ N(a) ,
which is the antecedent of property (scott) from Definition 4.8. However,M does not satisfy
∃j ∈ {1, . . . , 7} : Yj ∈ N(a) ,
which is the corresponding consequent of the indicated instance of (scott). So we see that if we
were to restrict ourselves to the class of epistemic neighborhood models satisfying this property,
we would no longer be able to use M as a counterexample to the claim that not every epistemic
neighborhood model gives rise to an agreeing probability measure. Of course ruling out M as a
counterexample to this claim does not prove the claim. However, utilizing (scott) in conjunction
with (d) and (sc), we are able to prove the claim. This proof makes crucial use of a theorem due to
Scott that is closely related to [Sco64, Theorem 4.1].
In preparation for the statement of Scott’s theorem, we recall some well-known notions from
linear algebra. For a nonempty set S, let L(S) denote the S-dimensional real vector space whose
vectors consist of functions x : S → R and whose operations of vector addition and scalar multipli-
cation are defined coordinate-wise: given vectors x, y : S → R and a scalar real r ∈ R, the vector
(x+ y) : S → R is defined by (x+ y)(s) := x(s) + y(s) for each coordinate s ∈ S and the vector
(r ·x) : S → R is defined by (r ·x)(s) := r ·x(s) for each coordinate s ∈ S. Note that we have just
used the usual notational overloading wherein the + or · symbol on one side of an equation refers
to the vector operation, and yet the same symbol on the other side of the same equation refers to
the operation in R. Other common notational abbreviations such as omission of ·’s and writing−x
for (−1) ·x will be used. To say that a vector x : S → R is rational means that all of its coordinates
(i.e., values) are rational numbers. To say a set X ⊆ L(S) of vectors is rational means that every
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vector in X is rational, and to say that X is symmetric means that X = −X := {−x | x ∈ X}.
A linear functional on L(S) is a function f : L(S) → R satisfying the following property of
linearity: for each r1, r2 ∈ R and x, y ∈ L(S), we have f(r1x+ r2y) = r1 · f(x) + r2 · f(y).
Theorem 4.9 ([Sco64, Theorem 1.2]). Let S be a finite nonempty set and X be a finite, rational,
symmetric subset ofL(S). For each N ⊆ X , there exists a linear functional f on L(S) that realizes
N , meaning
N = {x ∈ X | f(x) ≥ 0} ,
if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• for each x ∈ X , we have x ∈ N or −x ∈ N ; and
• for each integer n ≥ 0 and x0, . . . , xn ∈ N , we have
n∑
i=0
xi = 0 ⇒ −x0 ∈ N .
We use this theorem to show that mid-threshold models always give rise to an agreeing proba-
bility measure. That is, the neighborhood function of mid-threshold models picks out exactly those
neighborhoods that may be assigned a probability exceeding 1
2
. Many of the key ideas of the proof
of the following result are due to Lenzen [Len80]. However, the argument we present here has
been rewritten in a streamlined, modern form and in the language of our epistemic neighborhood
models. Despite this difference (and the necessary work we had to undertake to translate these
results into this modern form), we are happy to credit Professor Lenzen for the following result.
Theorem 4.10 ([Len80]). Let M = (W,R, V,N) be a mid-threshold epistemic neighborhood
model. There exists a probability measure P : ℘(W ) → [0, 1] agreeing with M for threshold 1
2
;
that is,
• P satisfies full support (i.e., P (w) 6= 0 for each w ∈ W ); and
• for each w ∈ W and X ⊆ [w], we have
X ∈ N(w) iff Pw(X) := P (X|[w]) > 12 .
Proof. We credit Lenzen [Len80] for this proof, though we herein provide an original reformula-
tion of his work within the setting of the epistemic neighborhood models introduced in this paper.
Proceeding, for w ∈ W , define Sw := [w]. For each X ⊆ Sw, define the relative complement
X ′ := Sw −X and let ι(X) : Sw → {0, 1} be the characteristic function of X:
ι(X)(s) :=
{
1 if s ∈ X,
0 otherwise.
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We consider the following finite subsets of L(Sw):
Aw := {ι(X) | X ⊆ Sw} ,
Bw := {ι(X)− ι(X
′) | X ⊆ Sw & X ′ /∈ N(w)} ,
Nw := Aw ∪ Bw ,
Xw := Nw ∪ (−Nw) .
It is easy to see thatNw ⊆ Xw and that Xw is a finite, rational, and symmetric subset of L(Sw). We
wish to show that Nw and Xw satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.9. First, we note that x ∈ Xw
implies x ∈ Nw or −x ∈ Nw by the definition of Xw.
For the second condition of Theorem 4.9, suppose we are given an integer n ≥ 0 such that
x0, . . . , xn ∈ Nw and
∑n
i=0 xi = 0. We wish to show that −x0 ∈ Nw. Proceeding, there exists an
integer ℓ satisfying:
0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ implies xi = ι(Xi)− ι(X ′i) ∈ Bw , and
ℓ < i ≤ n implies xi = ι(Xi) ∈ Aw .
Toward a contradiction, assume there exists i > ℓ with xi 6= 0. Then for x∗ :=
∑n
i=ℓ+1 xi, we have
x∗(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ Sw, and there exists s∗ ∈ Sw with x∗(s∗) > 0. Hence∑ℓ
i=0 xi =
∑ℓ
i=0
(
ι(Xi)− ι(X ′i)
)
= −x∗ ,
where −x∗(s∗) < 0 and −x∗(s) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ Sw. So for each s ∈ Sw, the number of the
sets in the list X ′0, . . . , X ′ℓ containing s is greater than or equal to the number of the sets in the list
X0, . . . , Xℓ containing s. Further, s∗ is a member of strictly more sets in the former list than those
in the latter. By renumbering, we may assume that s∗ ∈ X ′0 −X0. Then we have
X0 ∪ {s
∗}, X1, . . . , XℓIX
′
0, X
′
1, . . . , X
′
ℓ .
Since X ′0, . . . , X ′ℓ /∈ N(w), it follows by (scott) that X0 ∪ {s∗} /∈ N(w). But X0 ( X0 ∪ {s∗} /∈
N(w) and X ′0 /∈ N(w), which violates (sc). Conclusion: i > ℓ implies xi = 0. But then we have∑n
i=0 xi =
∑ℓ
i=0 xi. Since xi = ι(Xi)− ι(X ′i) for i ≤ ℓ, it follows that
∑ℓ
i=0 ι(Xi) =
∑ℓ
i=0 ι(X
′
i).
But the latter is what it means to have (XiEX ′i)ℓi=0. Since X ′i /∈ N(w) for i ≤ ℓ by the definition of
Bw, it follows by (scott) that X0 /∈ N(w). But then ι(X ′0)− ι(X0) = −x0 ∈ Bw ⊆ Nw, as desired.
So we may apply Theorem 4.9: there exists a linear functional fw on L(Sw) that realizes Nw.
That is,
Nw = {x ∈ Xw | fw(x) ≥ 0} .
Define gw : ℘(Sw) → R by the composition gw(X) := fw(ι(X)). This function satisfies a few
important properties.
1. X ∈ N(w) iff gw(X) > gw(X ′).
SupposeX ∈ N(w). ThenX ′ /∈ N(w) by (d). Hence ι(X)−ι(X ′) ∈ Bw and ι(X ′)−ι(X) /∈
Bw. Since Sw ∈ N(w) by (n), it follows that X 6= ∅ = S ′w. But then the coordinates of
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ι(X ′)− ι(X) contain at least one 1 and at least one−1. Since every x ∈ Aw has coordinates
that are 1’s or 0’s only, it follows that ι(X ′)− ι(X) /∈ Nw. As ι(X)− ι(X ′) ∈ Bw ⊆ Nw and
fw is linear and realizes Nw, it follows that gw(X) ≥ gw(X ′) and gw(X ′)  gw(X). That is,
gw(X) > gw(X
′).
Conversely, suppose gw(X) > gw(X ′). Since fw is linear and realizes Nw, it follows that
ι(X ′)− ι(X) /∈ Nw ⊇ Bw. Applying the definition of Bw, we have X ∈ N(w).
2. gw(Sw) > gw(∅) = 0.
We have gw(∅) = fw(0) = 0 by the linearity of fw. Since Sw ∈ N(w) by (n), it follows that
gw(Sw) > gw(∅) by property 1.
3. If 0 ≤ gw(X) ≤ gw(Sw).
Since ι(X) ∈ Aw ⊆ Nw and fw realizesNw, we have gw(X) ≥ 0. So each X ⊆ Sw satisfies
gw(X) ≥ 0. From this it follows by the linearity of fw that for each X ⊆ Sw, we have
gw(X) =
∑
v∈X gw({v}) ≤
∑
v∈Sw
gw({v}) = gw(Sw) .
4. If X, Y ⊆ Sw and X ∩ Y = ∅, then gw(X ∪ Y ) = gw(X) + gw(Y ).
By the linearity of fw.
5. ∅ 6= X ⊆ Sw implies gw(X) > 0.
Suppose ∅ 6= X ⊆ Sw. By property 2, it suffices to prove the result for X 6= Sw. Toward
a contradiction, assume gw(X) = 0 for ∅ ( X ( Sw. By property 4, we have gw(Sw) =
gw(X) + gw(X
′) = gw(X
′). Since fw is linear and realizes Nw and
ι(X ′)− ι(Sw) = −(ι(Sw)− ι(X
′)) = −ι(X) ∈ Xw ,
we obtain −ι(X) ∈ Nw. But ∅ ( X ( Sw implies that −ι(X) has coordinates containing
at least one −1 and at least one 0. Since members of Aw have coordinates made up of 0’s
and 1’s, members of Bw have coordinates made up of −1’s and 1’s, and Nw = Aw ∪ Bw, it
cannot be the case that −ι(X) ∈ Nw. Contradiction. Conclusion: gw(X) > 0.
Now take v ∈ [w]. Since N(v) = N(w) by (a), it follows that gw also realizes Nv. So, letting
[W ] be the set {[w] | w ∈ W} of equivalence classes, let h : [W ] → W be a choice function that
selects for each class [w] ∈ [W ] a representative h([w]) ∈ [w]. Using a notational overloading that
ought to be harmless, we define a new function hw : ℘([w])→ R by setting hw(X) := gh([w])(X).
Obviously, v ∈ [w] implies hv = hw. Finally, we define P : ℘(W )→ [0, 1] by
P (X) :=
∑
[w]∈[W ]
hw(X ∩ [w])
hw([w])
.
Note that by property 2, the denominator hw([w]) is always nonzero.
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We prove that P is a probability measure on ℘(W ) satisfying full support. First, P satisfies the
Kolmogorov axioms over the finite algebra ℘(W ): we have P (X) ≥ 0 by property 3, P (W ) = 1
by property 2 and the definition of P , and P (X ∪ Y ) = P (X) + P (Y ) for disjoint X and Y by
property 4 and the definition of P . Second, full support follows by property 5.
Finally, for X ⊆ [w], we have by property 1 that X ∈ N(w) iff hw(X) > hw(X ′). But the
latter holds iff we have (making use of property 4) that
2 · hw(X) > hw(X) + hw(X
′) = hw([w]) .
By property 2, the definition of P , and the fact that X ⊆ [w], the above inequality holds iff
P (X) =
hw(X)
hw([w])
> 1
2
.
Corollary 4.11. LetM = (W,R, V,N) be a mid-threshold epistemic neighborhood model. There
exists an epistemic probability model N = (W,R, V, P ) that agrees with M for threshold 1
2
.
Proof. Let P be the measure given by Theorem 4.10.
4.3 Epistemic Neighborhood Models from Probability Measures
In the last subsection, we investigated the question of whether an epistemic neighborhood model
gives rise to an agreeing epistemic probability model. In this section, we look at this question the
other way around: given an epistemic probability model and a threshold c, is there an agreeing
epistemic neighborhood model? As we will see, the answer is always “yes.”
Definition 4.12. Given an epistemic probability model M = (W,R, V, P ) and a threshold c ∈
[1
2
, 1) ∩Q, we define the structureMc := (W,R, V,N c) by setting
N c(w) := {X ⊆ [w] | Pw(X) > c} .
Intuitively, the agent believes a proposition X at world w (i.e., X ∈ N c(w)) if and only if X is
epistemically possible (i.e., X ⊆ [w]) and the probability she assigns to X at world w exceeds the
threshold (i.e., Pw(X) > c).
Lemma 4.13 (Correctness). Fix c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q. If M is an epistemic probability model, then Mc
is an epistemic neighborhood model. Furthermore, M 12 is a mid-threshold neighborhood model.
Proof. We verify that N c satisfies the required properties.
• For (kbc), X ∈ N c(w) implies X ⊆ [w] by definition.
• For (kbf), Pw(∅) = 0 < c, so ∅ /∈ N c(w).
• For (n), Pw([w]) = 1 > c, so [w] ∈ N c(w).
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• For (a), suppose X ∈ N c(w) and v ∈ [w]. Then Pw(X) > c. Since v ∈ [w] implies
[w] = [v], we have
Pw(X) =
P (X ∩ [w])
P ([w])
=
P (X ∩ [v])
P ([v])
= Pv(X) .
Hence Pv(X) > c, so X ∈ N c(v).
• For (kbm), suppose X ∈ N c(w). Then Pw(X) > c. Hence if Y satisfies X ⊆ Y ⊆ [w], we
have Pw(Y ) > c and so Y ∈ N c(w).
So Mc is an epistemic neighborhood model. We now show that M 12 satisfies the additional re-
quired properties.
• For (d), assume c ∈ [1
2
, 1) ∩ Q and X ∈ N c(w). Then Pw(X) > c, and therefore Pw([w]−
X) ≤ 1− c ≤ c. Hence [w]−X /∈ N c(w).
• For (sc), assume X ′ := [Γ] − X /∈ N 12 (w) and X ( Y ⊆ [Γ]. From the first assumption,
we have Pw(X ′) ≤ 12 , and therefore that Pw(X) ≥
1
2
. Applying the second assumption,
Pw(Y ) > Pw(X) ≥
1
2
, and hence X ∈ N 12 (w).
• For (scott), we assume c ∈ (0, 1
2
] ∩Q along with the following:
(XiIYi)
m
i=1 (9)
X1 ∈ N
c(w) (10)
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , m} : [Γ]−Xi /∈ N
c(w) (11)
From (9) it follows that
Pw(X1) + · · ·+ Pw(Xm) ≤ Pw(Y1) + · · ·+ Pw(Ym) (12)
The argument for this is similar to an argument for (7) in proof of Theorem 3.9(11). From
(10), we have Pw(X1) > c. From (11), we have for each i ∈ {2, . . . , m} that Pw([w]−Xi) ≤
c and therefore that Pw(Xi) ≥ 1 − c ≥ c since c ∈ (0, 12 ] ∩ Q. Hence the left side of (12)
exceeds mc. Since every summand on the right side of the inequality is positive and mc > 0,
it follows that at least one member of the right side of (12) must exceed c. That is, there
exists j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that Pw(Yj) > c and hence Yj ∈ N c(w).
Theorem 4.14. Let c ∈ (0, 1)∩Q and M = (W,R, V, P ) be an epistemic probability model. The
epistemic neighborhood model Mc = (W,R, V,N c) agrees with M for threshold c.
Proof. By definition of N c.
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5 Calculi for Belief as Willingness to Bet
We now consider an axiomatic link both with epistemic neighborhood models and with epistemic
probability models. We study two calculi: the calculus KB of epistemic neighborhood models, and
the calculus KB.5 of mid-threshold neighborhood models. Regarding the probability interpretation,
KB is sound for every threshold but not complete for any threshold. KB.5 is both sound and
complete for the probability interpretation with threshold c = 1
2
.
KB.5 is our modern reformulation of Lenzen’s [Len80] calculus for the logic of knowledge
(i.e., Lenzen’s “acceptance”) as probabilistic certainty and belief as probability exceeding thresh-
old 1
2
. Lenzen’s intended semantic structures are something like epistemic probability models. Our
intended semantic structures are our mid-threshold neighborhood models, though there is a natu-
ral link with epistemic probability models via Theorem 4.10. In fact, many of the main ideas of
our proof of Theorem 4.10 are not doubt translations of Lenzen’s ideas into the language of our
epistemic neighborhood models. Since we have rewritten all proofs using our own approach and
modern modal notions, it is difficult to determine whether we have introduced novel mathematical
results on top of Lenzen’s existing work, though we suspect that anything new we may have added
along these lines (excluding of course epistemic neighborhood models themselves and all related
results except Theorem 4.10) may be slight at best. Therefore, we are happy to credit Professor
Lenzen for the probabilistic soundness and completeness of KB.5 and for Theorem 4.10. Never-
theless, we do think that it is worth our effort to provide this modern reformulation of his results.
In particular, we believe that in using semantic structures more familiar to the modern modal logi-
cian, our modern reformulation of Lenzen’s results will make the mathematical details of Lenzen’s
work more accessible to a modern English-language audience. We also hope that our use of the
modal neighborhood structures will suggest directions for further study of qualitative probability
via tools from modal logic.
Definition 5.1. We define the following theories in the language LKB.
• KB is defined in Table 1.
• KB.5 is obtained from KB by adding (D), (SC), and (Scott) from Table 2.
• KB.5− is obtained from KB.5 by omitting (BF) and (KBM).
We will see later in Theorem 5.6 that KB.5 and KB.5− derive the same theorems.
5.1 Results for the Basic Calculus KB
The following result shows that if we restrict attention to provable statements whose only modality
is single-agent belief Bϕ, then KB is an extension of the minimal modal logic EMN45 + ¬B⊥ =
EMN45+(BF) obtained by adding S5-knowledge and the knowledge-belief connection principles
(Ap), (An), and (KBM).2 The modal theory KB.5, which we will see is equivalent to KB.5−, is a
2EMN45+ (BF) is the logic of single-agent belief (without knowledge) having Schemes (CL) (Table 1), M (The-
orem 5.2(2)), (N) (Table 1), 4 (Theorem 5.2(5)), 5 (Theorem 5.2(6)), and (BF) (Table 1) along with Rules (MP)
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AXIOM SCHEMES
(CL) Schemes of Classical Propositional Logic
(KS5) S5 axiom schemes for each K
(BF) ¬B⊥
(N) B⊤
(Ap) Bϕ→ KBϕ
(An) ¬Bϕ→ K¬Bϕ
(KBM) K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bϕ→ Bψ)
RULES
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
ψ
(MP) ϕ
Kϕ
(MN)
Table 1: The theory KB
(D) Bϕ→ Bˇϕ
(SC) Bˇϕ ∧ Kˇ(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)→ B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(Scott) [(ϕiIψi)mi=1 ∧ Bϕ1 ∧
∧m
i=2 Bˇϕi]→
∨m
i=1Bψi
Table 2: Additional axiom schemes for the theory KB.5
knowledge-inclusive extension of EMND45+(Scott) that adds the additional connection principle
(SC).3 In Section 5.2, we will show that KB.5 is the modal logic for probabilistic belief with
threshold c = 1
2
.
Theorem 5.2 (KB Derivables). We have each of the following.
1. KB ⊢ Kϕ→ Bϕ.
“Knowledge implies belief.”
2. KB ⊢ B(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (Bϕ ∧Bψ).
This is “Scheme M” [Che80, Ch. 8].
3. KB ⊢ Kϕ ∧ Bψ → B(ϕ ∧ ψ).
If the antecedent Kϕ were replaced by Bϕ, then we would obtain “Scheme C” [Che80,
Ch. 8]. So we do not have Scheme C outright but instead a knowledge-weakened version:
(Table 1) and RE (Theorem 5.2(12)). This is a “monotonic” system of modal logic satisfying positive and negative
belief introspection (4 and 5) and the property (BF) that falsehood⊥ is not believed. See [Che80, Ch. 8] for details on
naming minimal modal logics.
3EMND45+ (Scott) is EMN45+ (BF) minus Scheme (BF) plus Schemes (D) and (Scott) from Table 2.
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in order to conclude belief of a conjunction from belief of one of the conjuncts, the other
conjunct must be known (and not merely believed, as is required by the stronger, non-KB-
provable Scheme C).
4. KB ⊢ K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bˇϕ→ Bˇψ).
This is the dual version of our (KBM).
5. KB ⊢ Bϕ→ BBϕ.
This is “Scheme 4” for belief [Che80, Ch. 8].
6. KB ⊢ ¬Bϕ→ B¬Bϕ.
This is “Scheme 5” for belief [Che80, Ch. 8].
7. KB ⊢ Bϕ↔ KBϕ.
This says that belief and knowledge of belief are equivalent.
8. KB ⊢ ¬Bϕ↔ K¬Bϕ.
This says that non-belief and knowledge of non-belief are equivalent.
9. KB ⊢ ϕ implies KB ⊢ Bϕ.
This is the rule of Modus Ponens (or Modal Necessitation), sometimes called “Rule RN”
[Che80, Ch. 8].
10. KB ⊢ ϕ→ ψ implies KB ⊢ Bϕ→ Bψ.
This is “Rule RM” [Che80, Ch. 8].
11. KB ⊢ ϕ→ ψ implies KB ⊢ Bˇϕ→ Bˇψ.
This is the dual version of RM.
12. KB ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ implies KB ⊢ Bϕ↔ Bψ.
This is “Rule RE” [Che80, Ch. 8].
13. KB ⊢ ϕ→ ⊥ implies KB ⊢ ¬Bϕ.
This says that no self-contradictory sentence is believed. This may be viewed as a certain
generalization of (BF) (Table 1).
Proof. We reason in KB. For 1, we have Kϕ→ K(⊤ → ϕ) by elementary modal reasoning. But
then from this, B⊤ by (N), and K(⊤ → ϕ) → (B⊤ → Bϕ) by (KBM), it follows by classical
reasoning that we have Kϕ→ Bϕ.
For 2, we derive
K((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ)→ (B(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ Bϕ) (13)
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by (KBM), and the antecedent of (13) by (CL) and (MN). Therefore, the consequent of (13) is
derivable by (MN). By a similar argument, B(ϕ ∧ ψ) → Bψ is derivable. By classical reasoning,
2 is derivable.
For 3, we derive
Kϕ→ K(ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)) and (14)
K(ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ))→ (Bψ → B(ϕ ∧ ψ)) . (15)
(14) follows by S5 reasoning. (15) follows by (KBM). Applying classical reasoning to (14) and
(15), we obtain
Kϕ→ (Bψ → B(ϕ ∧ ψ)) ,
from which 3 follows by classical reasoning.
For 4, we derive
K(ϕ→ ψ)→ K(¬ψ → ¬ϕ) and (16)
K(¬ψ → ¬ϕ)→ (B¬ψ → B¬ϕ) . (17)
(16) follows by S5 reasoning. (17) follows by (KBM). Applying classical reasoning to (16) and
(17), we obtain
K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (B¬ψ → B¬ϕ) ,
from which 4 follows by classical reasoning (just contrapose the consequent).
5 follows by (Ap) and 1. 6 follows by (An) and 1. 7 follows by by (Ap) for the right-to-left and
(KS5) for the left-to-right. 8 follows by (An) for the right-to-left and (KS5) for the left-to-right.
9 follows by (MN) and 1. 10 follows by (MN) and (KBM). 11 follows by contraposition, (MN),
(KBM), and contraposition. 12 follows from 10 by classical reasoning.
For 13, we have
K(ϕ→ ⊥)→ (Bϕ→ B⊥) (18)
by (KBM). Therefore, if ϕ → ⊥ is provable, it follows by (MN) that the antecedent of (18) is as
well. By (MP), the consequent Bϕ → B⊥ is provable. Applying (BF) and classical reasoning, it
follows by contraposition that ¬Bϕ is provable.
Theorem 5.3 (KB Neighborhood Soundness and Completeness). KB is sound and complete with
respect to the class C of epistemic neighborhood models:
∀ϕ ∈ LKB : KB ⊢ ϕ ⇔ C |=n ϕ .
Proof. By induction on the length of derivation. We first verify soundness of the axioms.
• Validity of (CL) immediate. Validity of (KS5) follows because the R’s are equivalence
relations [BdRV01].
• Scheme (BF) is valid: |=n ¬B⊥.
J⊥Kn = ∅ /∈ N(w) by (kbf). Hence M, w 6|=n B⊥.
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• Scheme (N) is valid: |=n B⊤.
J⊤Kn ∩ [w] = [w] ∈ N(w) by (n). Hence M, w |=n B⊤.
• Scheme (Ap) is valid: |=n Bϕ→ KBϕ.
SupposeM, w |=n Bϕ. Then [w]∩ JϕKn ∈ N(w). Take v ∈ [w]. We have [v] = [w] because
R is an equivalence relation, and we have N(v) = N(w) by (a). Hence [v] ∩ JϕKn ∈ N(v);
that is, M, v |=n Bϕ. Since v ∈ [w] was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that [w] ⊆
JBϕKn. Hence M, w |=n KBϕ.
• Scheme (An) is valid: |=n ¬Bϕ→ K¬Bϕ.
Replace Bϕ by ¬Bϕ and ∈ by /∈ in the argument for the previous item.
• Scheme (KBM) is valid: |=n K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bϕ→ Bψ).
Suppose M, w |=n K(ϕ → ψ) and M, w |=n Bϕ. This means [w] ⊆ Jϕ→ ψKn and
[w] ∩ JϕKn ∈ N(w). But then
[w] ∩ JϕKn ⊆ [w] ∩ JϕKn ∩ Jϕ→ ψKn ⊆ [w] ∩ JψKn .
Hence [w] ∩ JψKn ∈ N(w) by (kbm). That is, M, w |=n Bψ.
That validity is closed under applications of the rules MP and MN follows by the standard argu-
ments [BdRV01]. This completes the proof of soundness.
Before we prove completeness, we first prove an important result that we will use tacitly
throughout the completeness proof proper. Let M be the set of all LKB-formulas having one of
the forms Kϕ, ¬Kϕ, Bϕ, or ¬Bϕ. We prove the following Modal-Assumption Deduction Theo-
rem: for each finite F ⊆ M , we have
F ⊢KB ϕ iff ⊢KB (
∧
F )→ ϕ .
The right-to-left direction straightforward. The proof of the left-to-right direction is by induction
on the length of derivation. All cases are standard except for the induction step in which (MN)
is applied, so we focus on this case. Suppose F ⊢KB Kϕ is derived by (MP) from ϕ such that
F ⊢KB ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, we have ⊢KB (
∧
χ∈F χ) → ϕ. By (MN) and K reasoning,
we have ⊢KB (
∧
χ∈F Kχ) → Kϕ. However, it also follows by S5 reasoning (using schemes
4 and 5), scheme (Ap), scheme (An), and the fact that F ⊆ M that we have ⊢KB χ → Kχ
for each χ ∈ F . Hence ⊢KB (
∧
χ∈F χ) → (
∧
χ∈F Kχ), where (
∧
χ∈F χ) =
∧
F . Conclusion:
⊢KB (
∧
F )→ Kϕ.
To prove completeness, it suffices to show that KB 0 ¬θ implies θ is satisfiable at a pointed
epistemic neighborhood model. For two sets F and F ′ of LKB-formulas, to say that F is maxcons
in F ′ means that F ⊆ F ′, the set F is KB-consistent (i.e., for no finite G ⊆ F do we have
⊢KB (
∧
G)→ ⊥), and adding any formula ψ ∈ F ′ not already in F will produce a KB-inconsistent
(i.e., not KB-consistent) set.
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For a set F of LKB-formulas, we define the single-negation closure ±F of F and the modal
closure MCl(F ) of F to be the sets
±F := F ∪ {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ F} ∪ {⊥,⊤} ,
MCl(F ) := F ∪ {Xϕ | ϕ ∈ F and X ∈ {K,¬K,B,¬B}} .
In particular, MCl(F ) is obtained from F by adding for each formulaϕ ∈ F the additional formulas
Kϕ, ¬Kϕ, Bϕ, and ¬Bϕ. We say the each of the latter four formulas is a modalization of ϕ.
Let S be the set of subformulas of θ, including θ itself. Let C0 be the Boolean closure of S;
that is, C0 is the smallest extension of S that contains the propositional constants ⊤ (truth) and ⊥
(falsehood), or their abbreviations in LKB if they are not primitive, and is closed under the Boolean
connectives (e.g., negation, conjunction, implication, and disjunction) definable in the language.
Finally, define C := MCl(C0).
We define the structureM = (W,R, V,N) as follows:
W := {w ⊆ C | w is maxcons in C},
[ϕ] := {w ∈ W | ϕ ∈ w} for ϕ ∈ C,
R := {(w, v) ∈ W 2 | w ∩M = v ∩M},
V (w) := P ∩ w,
N(w) := {X ⊆ [w] | ∃ϕ ∈ C : (X = [ϕ] ∩ [w] and w ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ)}.
We make use (often tacitly) of the following In-class Identity Lemma: for each u, v ∈ W , if
[u] = [v] and u ∩ ±S = v ∩ ±S, then u = v. So suppose [u] = [v] and u ∩ S ′ = v ∩ S ′. Given
ϕ ∈ u, we wish to show that ϕ ∈ u. There are two cases to consider.
• Case: ϕ ∈ u ∩ C0.
ϕ is a Boolean combination of members of S and is therefore KB-provably equivalent to a
formula ϕ′ that is a disjunction of conjunctions of maxcons subsets of ±S. It follows by
the maximal KB-consistency of u that ϕ′ ∈ u and hence one of the disjuncts ϕ′′ of ϕ′ is a
member of u. Applying the maimal KB-consistency of u, it follows from ϕ′′ ∈ u that every
conjunct of ϕ′′ is a member of u. But each conjunct of ϕ′′ is a member of ±S ⊆ S ′ and
hence each conjunct of ϕ′′ is a member of v by our assumption u ∩ S ′ = v ∩ S ′. Applying
the maximal KB-consistency of v, it follows that ϕ′′ ∈ v, hence ϕ′ ∈ v, and hence ϕ ∈ v.
• Case: ϕ ∈ u ∩ (C − C0).
ϕ is a modalization Xψ of a Boolean combination of members of S. But Xψ ∈ M and our
assumption [u] = [v] implies u ∩M = v ∩M . So Xψ ∈ v.
The converse is proved similarly.
The In-class Identity Lemma gives rise to the following Identity Lemma: for each u, v ∈ W ,
if u ∩ MCl(±S) = v ∩MCl(±S), then u = v. Indeed, suppose u ∩ MCl(±S) = v ∩ MCl(±S).
If [u] = [v], then it follows from ±S ⊆ MCl(±S) that we have u ∩ ±S = v ∩ ±S, and therefore
u = v by the In-class Identity Lemma. So it suffices to prove that [u] = [v]; that is, we prove that
31
u ∩M = v ∩M . Proceeding, take Xϕ ∈ u ∩M . If Xϕ ∈ C0, then we have Xϕ ∈ v ∩M by the
argument in the first case of the In-class Identity Lemma. So suppose Xϕ ∈ C − C0 so that Xϕ
is a modalization of ϕ ∈ C0. We have ⊢KB ϕ ↔ ϕ′, where ϕ′ is a disjunction of conjunctions of
maxcons subsets of ±S. Applying (MN) and K reasoning, we obtain
⊢KB Kϕ↔ Kϕ
′ and ⊢KB ¬Kϕ↔ ¬Kϕ′ . (19)
Applying (KBM) and classical reasoning to (19), it follows that
⊢KB Bϕ↔ Bϕ
′ and ⊢KB ¬Bϕ↔ ¬Bϕ′ . (20)
Since Xϕ ∈ u, we have by (19), (20), and the maximal KB-consistency of u that Xϕ′ ∈ u ∩
MCl(±S). Since u ∩MCl(±S) = v ∩MCl(±S), it follows that Xϕ′ ∈ v, and hence Xϕ ∈ v by
the maximal KB-consistency of v. The converse is proved similarly.
We may make use (often tacitly) of the following Definability Lemma: for each w ∈ W and
each X ⊆ [w], defining
Xd :=
∨
v∈X
∧
(v ∩ ±S) ,
it follows that Xd ∈ C0 ⊆ C and [Xd] ∩ [w] = X . For the proof, first note that Xd ∈ C0 because
C0 is closed under Boolean operations and ±S ⊆ C0 ⊆ C. So assume u ∈ [Xd] ∩ [w], which
implies Xd ∈ u and [u] = [w]. Since u is maxcons in C ⊇ ±S, we have by the above definition
of Xd as a disjunction over v ∈ X that there exists v ∈ X such that ∧(v ∩ ±S) ∈ u and hence
v∩±S ⊆ u. Since u is maxcons in C and hence maxcons in±S and since±S is closed under the
operation ∼ : LKB → LKB defined by
∼ϕ :=
{
ψ if ϕ = ¬ψ
¬ϕ otherwise,
it follows that u ∩ ±S = v ∩ ±S. So since [u] = [v] and u ∩ ±S = v ∩ ±S, we have u = v ∈ X
by the Identity Lemma. Conversely, suppose u ∈ X ⊆ [w]. By the definition of Xd, we have
KB ⊢
∧
(u ∩ ±S) → Xd and therefore Xd ∈ u because u is maxcons in C and
∧
(u ∩ ±S) ∈ u.
Hence u ∈ [Xd] ∩ [w] because u ∈ X ⊆ [w].
Our definitions above specify the structure M = (W,R, V,N). W is nonempty because θ is
consistent and so may be extended to a maxcons wθ ∈ W . Since MCl(±S) is finite, it follows
by the Identity Lemma that W is finite. Further, R is an equivalence relation. So to conclude
that M is an epistemic neighborhood model, all that remains is for us to show that N satisfies the
neighborhood function properties.
(kbc) X ∈ N(w) implies X ⊆ [w].
By definition.
(bf) ∅ /∈ N(w).
Choose ϕ ∈ C satisfying [ϕ] ∩ [w] = ∅. It follows that w ∩M ⊢KB ϕ→ ⊥, since otherwise
we could extend (w∩M)∪{ϕ} to some v ∈ [ϕ]∩ [w], which would contradict [ϕ]∩ [w] = ∅.
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So by (MN), we have w∩M ⊢KB K(ϕ→ ⊥) and hence w∩M ⊢KB Bϕ→ B⊥ by (KBM).
Since w ∩M ⊢ ¬B⊥ by (BF), it follows that w ∩M ⊢KB ¬Bϕ. So we have shown that
w ∩M ⊢KB ¬Bϕ for each ϕ ∈ C satisfying [ϕ] ∩ [w] = ∅. KB is consistent (just apply
soundness to any epistemic neighborhood model), and therefore we have w ∩M 0KB Bϕ
for each ϕ ∈ C satisfying [ϕ] ∩ [w] = ∅. Conclusion: ∅ /∈ N(w).
(n) [w] ∈ N(w).
w ∩M ⊢KB B⊤ by (N). Hence [⊤] ∩ [w] = [w] ∈ N(w).
(a) v ∈ [w] implies N(v) = N(w).
v ∈ [w] implies [v] = [w] and v ∩M = w ∩M . Therefore for each X ⊆ [v] = [w], we have
ϕ ∈ C satisfying X = [ϕ] ∩ [v] and v ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ iff X = [ϕ] ∩ [w] and w ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ.
Hence N(v) = N(w).
(kbm) If X ⊆ Y ⊆ [w] and X ∈ N(w), then Y ∈ N(w).
Suppose X ⊆ Y ⊆ [w] and X ∈ N(w). Then there is ϕ ∈ C satisfying X = [ϕ] ∩ [w]
and w ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ. Since X ⊆ Y , it follows that [ϕ] ∩ [w] ⊆ [Y d] ∩ [w]. From this we
obtain that w ∩M ⊢KB ϕ → Y d, since otherwise we could extend (w ∩M) ∪ {ϕ,¬Y d}
to some v ∈ [ϕ] ∩ [¬Y d] ∩ [w], which would contradict [ϕ] ∩ [w] ⊆ [Y d] ∩ [w]. Hence
w ∩ M ⊢KB K(ϕ → Y d) by (MN) and so w ∩ M ⊢KB Bϕ → BY d by (KBM). Since
w ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ, we have w ∩M ⊢KB BY d. Hence Y ∈ N(w).
So M is indeed and epistemic neighborhood model. To complete our overall argument, it suffices
to prove the Truth Lemma: for each ϕ ∈ C and w ∈ W , we have ϕ ∈ w iff M, w |=n ϕ. The
argument is by induction on the construction of ϕ ∈ C. Boolean cases are straightforward, so we
restrict our attention to the modal cases: formulas Bϕ and Kϕ in C. Note that by the definition of
C as the Boolean closure of the set S of subformulas of θ, either of Bϕ ∈ C or Kϕ ∈ C implies
ϕ ∈ C.
Suppose Bϕ ∈ w. Then w ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ and hence [ϕ] ∩ [w] ∈ N(w) by the definition of N
and the fact that ϕ ∈ C. Applying the induction hypothesis, [ϕ] = JϕKMn , so JϕKMn ∩ [w] ∈ N(w).
But this is what it means to haveM, w |=n Bϕ.
Conversely, assume M, w |=n Bϕ for Bϕ ∈ C. This means JϕKMn ∩ [w] ∈ N(w). By the
induction hypothesis and the fact that ϕ ∈ C, we have [ϕ] = JϕKMn , so [ϕ] ∩ [w] ∈ N(w). By the
definition of N , there exists ψ ∈ C such that w ∩M ⊢KB Bψ and [ϕ] ∩ [w] = [ψ] ∩ [w]. But then
w ∩M ⊢KB ψ → ϕ, for otherwise we could extend (w ∩M) ∪ {ψ,¬ϕ} to some v ∈ [w] such that
v ∈ [ψ] ∩ [w] and v /∈ [ϕ] ∩ [w], contradicting [ϕ] ∩ [w] = [ψ] ∩ [w]. Applying (MN), we have
w ∩M ⊢KB K(ψ → ϕ) and hence w ∩M ⊢KB Bψ → Bϕ by (KBM). Since w ∩M ⊢KB Bψ, it
follows that w ∩M ⊢KB Bϕ. And since w is maxcons in C, we conclude that Bϕ ∈ w.
Now suppose Kϕ ∈ w. Then for each v ∈ [w], we have that Kϕ ∈ v and therefore ϕ ∈ v by
S5 reasoning (using scheme T) and the fact that v is maxcons in C. But then we have shown that
[w] ⊆ [ϕ]. Since ϕ ∈ C, it follows by the induction hypothesis that [w] ⊆ JϕKMn , which is what it
means to have M, w |=n Kϕ.
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Conversely, assume M, w |=n Kϕ for Kϕ ∈ C. It follows that [w] ⊆ JϕKMn . By the induction
hypothesis, [w] ⊆ [ϕ]. But then w ∩M ⊢KB ϕ, for otherwise we could extend (w ∩M) ∪ {¬ϕ}
to some v ∈ [w] satisfying v /∈ [ϕ], contradicting [w] ⊆ [ϕ]. By (MN), we have w ∩M ⊢KB Kϕ.
Since Kϕ ∈ C and w is maxcons in C, it follows that Kϕ ∈ w.
Since KB is sound and complete with respect to the class of epistemic neighborhood models, we
would expect that in light of Theorem 4.7 that KB is at most sound for the probability interpretation.
Theorem 5.4 (KB Probability Soundness). KB is sound for any threshold c ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q with
respect to the class of epistemic probability models:
∀c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q, ∀ϕ ∈ LKB : KB ⊢ ϕ ⇒ |=p ϕc .
Proof. Theorems 3.2 and 3.9.
Theorem 5.5 (KB Probability Incompleteness). KB is incomplete for all thresholds c ∈ (0, 1)∩Q
with respect to the class of epistemic probability models:
∃ϕ ∈ LKB, ∀c ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q : |=p ϕc and KB 0 ϕ .
Proof. Take M as in the proof of Theorem 4.7. Let σ be the modal formula describing (M, a):
informally (and easily formalizable),
σ := ab¯ · · · g¯ ∧KW ∧ (
∧
Z∈N(a)BZ) ∧ (
∧
Z′∈℘(W )−N(a) ¬BZ
′) .
We have M, w |=n σ so that 6|=n ¬σ and therefore KB 0 ¬σ by Theorem 5.3. By the proof of
Theorem 4.7, there is no probability measure agreeing with M for any threshold. Hence |=p ¬σc.
So ϕ := ¬σ gives us the desired formula.
5.2 Results for the Mid-Threshold Calculus KB.5
We first show that the KB schemes (BF) and (KBM) are redundant in the theory KB.5.
Theorem 5.6. KB.5− and KB.5 derive the same theorems:
∀ϕ ∈ LKB : KB.5
− ⊢ ϕ ⇔ KB.5 ⊢ ϕ .
Proof. It suffices to prove that the schemes (BF) and (KBM) are derivable in KB.5−. For (KBM),
we have by Definition 3.7 that the formula ϕIψ is just
K
(
(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F0
∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1
)
, (21)
where we have explicitly indicated the subformulasF0 and F1 used in the notation of Definition 3.7.
Semantically, (21) says that in each of the agent’s accessible worlds, ψ is true whenever ϕ is true.
Now reasoning within KB.5−, it follows that K(ϕ → ψ) is provably equivalent to ϕIψ. But then
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from K(ϕ→ ψ) and Bϕ, we may derive ϕIψ and Bϕ, from which we may derive Bψ by (Scott).
Hence (KBM) is derivable.
We now consider (BF). The formula⊥ → ¬⊤ is a classical tautology and hence K(⊥ → ¬⊤)
follows by (MN). Hence by an instance of (KBM), which can be defined away in terms of axioms
other than (BF) as above, it follows that B⊥ → B¬⊤ and therefore that ¬B¬⊤ → ¬B⊥. Also
by (N), (D), and (MP), we may derive ¬B¬⊤. That is, (BF) is derivable.
Theorem 5.7 (KB.5 Neighborhood Soundness and Completeness). KB.5 is sound and complete
with respect to the class C.5 of mid-threshold neighborhood models:
∀ϕ ∈ LKB : KB.5 ⊢ ϕ ⇔ C
.5 |=n ϕ .
Proof. Soundness is by induction on the length of derivation. Most cases are as in the proof of
Theorem 5.3. We only need consider the remaining axiom schemes.
• Scheme (D) is valid: |=n Bϕ→ Bˇϕ.
SupposeM, w |=n Bϕ. This means [w] ∩ JϕKn ∈ N(w). By (d),
[w] ∩ J¬ψKn = [w]− JϕKn = [w]− ([w] ∩ JϕKn) /∈ N(w) .
But this is what it means to haveM, w |=n Bˇϕ.
• Scheme (SC) is valid: |=n Bˇϕ ∧ Kˇ(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)→ B(ϕ ∨ ψ).
SupposeM, w |=n Bˇϕ and M, w |=n Kˇ(¬ϕ ∧ ψ). It follows that
[w]− ([w] ∩ JϕKn) = [w] ∩ J¬ϕKn /∈ N(w)
and that there exists v ∈ [w] satisfyingM, v |= ¬ϕ∧ψ. But then [w]∩Jϕ ∨ ψKn ) [w]∩JϕKn
and therefore [w] ∩ Jϕ ∨ ψKn ∈ N(w) by (sc). Hence M, w |= B(ϕ ∨ ψ).
• Scheme (Scott) is valid:
|=n [(ϕiIψi)mi=1 ∧ Bϕ1 ∧
∧m
i=2 Bˇϕi]→
∨m
i=1Bψi .
Suppose (M, w) satisfies the antecedent of scheme (Scott). It follows that each v ∈ [w]
satisfies at least as many ϕi’s as ψi’s, that [w]∩ Jψ1Kn ∈ N(w), and that [w]− JϕkKn /∈ N(w)
for each k ∈ {2, . . . , m}. Hence
[w] ∩ Jϕ1Kn, . . . , [w] ∩ JϕmKnI[w] ∩ Jψ1Kn, . . . , [w] ∩ JψmKn ,
from which it follows by (scott) that [w] ∩ JψjKn ∈ N(w) for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Hence
M, w |=n Bψj , and thus M, w |=n
∨m
i=1Bψi.
Soundness has been proved.
For completeness, it suffices to show that the model M defined as in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.3—except that now derivability is always taken with respect to KB.5—is a mid-threshold
neighborhood model; the rest of the argument is as in that proof, mutatis mutandis. Most of the
properties of M are shown in that proof. What remains is for us to show that M also satisfies (d),
(sc), and (scott).
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(d) X ∈ N(w) implies X ′ /∈ N(w), where X ′ := [w]−X .
Suppose X ∈ N(w). Then we have ϕ ∈ C such that X = [ϕ] ∩ [w] and w ∩M ⊢KB.5 Bϕ.
By (D), it follows that w ∩M ⊢KB.5 Bˇϕ. Choose ψ ∈ C satisfying X ′ = [ψ]∩ [w]. We have
w ∩M ⊢KB.5 ψ → ¬ϕ, since otherwise we could extend (w ∩M) ∪ {ψ, ϕ} to a v ∈ [w]
such that v ∈ [ψ] ∩ [w] = X ′ and v ∈ [ϕ] ∩ [w] = X , contradicting X ′ ∩X = ∅. By (MP),
we have w ∩M ⊢KB.5 K(ψ → ¬ϕ) and therefore w ∩M ⊢KB.5 Bψ → B¬ϕ by (KBM). So
since Bˇϕ = ¬B¬ϕ, it follows by classical reasoning that w ∩M ⊢KB.5 Bˇϕ→ ¬Bψ. Since
w ∩M ⊢KB.5 Bˇϕ, it follows that w ∩M ⊢KB.5 ¬Bψ. By the consistency of KB.5 (which
follows by applying soundness to any mid-threshold epistemic neighborhood model), we
have w ∩M 0KB Bψ. So we have shown that w ∩M 0KB.5 Bψ for each ψ ∈ C satisfying
X ′ = [ψ] ∩ [w]. Conclusion: X ′ /∈ N(w).
(sc) If X ′ /∈ N(w) and X ( Y ⊆ [w], then Y ∈ N(w).
Assume X ′ /∈ N(w) and X ( Y ⊆ [w]. It follows from X ′ /∈ N(w) that we have w ∩
M 0KB.5 B(X ′)d. Since (X ′)d ∈ C0, it follows that B(X ′)d ∈ C = MCl(C0) and therefore
¬B(X ′)d ∈ w ∩M because w is maxcons in C. Hence w ∩M ⊢KB.5 ¬B(X ′)d. Now we
have w∩M ⊢KB.5 ¬Xd → (X ′)d, for otherwise we could extend (w∩M)∪{¬Xd,¬(X ′)d}
to some v ∈ [w] such that v ∈ [¬Xd]∩ [w] = X ′ and v ∈ [¬(X ′)d]∩ [w] = X , contradicting
X ′∩X = ∅. By (MP), we have w∩M ⊢KB.5 K(¬Xd → (X ′)d) and therefore w∩M ⊢KB.5
B¬Xd → B(X ′)d by (KBM). Since w∩M ⊢KB.5 ¬B(X ′)d, it follows by classical reasoning
that w ∩M ⊢KB.5 ¬B¬Xd. That is, w ∩M ⊢KB.5 BˇXd.
Further, since X ( Y ⊆ [w], it follows that there exists y ∈ Y − X satisfying y ∈ [Y d] −
[Xd] = [Y d ∧ ¬Xd]. Since ¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) ∈ C0, it follows that ¬K¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) ∈ C =
MCl(C0). But then K¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) /∈ w, for otherwise it would follow from y ∈ [w] that
w ∩M = y ∩M and hence K¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) ∈ y, from which it would follow by T and
the fact that y is maxcons in C that ¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) ∈ y, contradicting y ∈ [Y d ∧ ¬Xd].
So since K¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) /∈ w, we have by the fact that ¬K¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) ∈ C and the
maximal KB.5-consistency of w that ¬K¬(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) = Kˇ(Y d ∧ ¬Xd) ∈ w. Hence
w ∩ M ⊢KB.5 Kˇ(Y d ∧ ¬Xd). As w ∩ M ⊢KB.5 BˇXd as well, it follows by (SC) that
w∩M ⊢KB.5 B(Y d ∨Xd). But [Y d ∨Xd] = Y by our assumption X ( Y and therefore we
have shown that Y ∈ N(w).
(scott) If X1, . . . , Xm, Y1, . . . , Ym ⊆ [w], (XiIYi)mi=1, X1 ∈ N(w), and X ′i := [w]− Xi /∈ N(w)
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , m}, then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that Yj ∈ N(w).
Assume we have the above-stated antecedent of the (scott) property. It follows from X1 ∈
N(w) that w ∩ M ⊢KB.5 BXd1 . For i ∈ {2, . . . , m}, it follows from X ′i /∈ N(w) by an
argument as in the above proof for (sc) that w ∩ M ⊢ BˇXdi . If we can prove that w ∩
M ⊢KB.5 (Xdi IY
d
i )
m
i=1 as well, then we would have by (Scott) that w ∩M ⊢KB.5
∨m
j=1BY
d
j .
But then since BY dj ∈ C for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we would have BY dk ∈ w for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , m} by the maximal KB.5-consistency of w, hence w ∩ M ⊢KB.5 BY dk , and
hence Yk = [Y dk ] ∈ N(w).
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So it suffices for us to prove that w ∩ M ⊢KB.5 (Xdi IY di )mi=1. Proceeding, we recall that
(Xdi IY
d
i )
m
i=1 abbreviates the formula K(F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm), where Fk is the disjunction of all
conjunctions
d1X
d
1 ∧ · · · ∧ dmX
d
m ∧ e1Y
d
1 ∧ · · · ∧ emY
d
m , (22)
satisfying the property that exactly k of the di’s are the empty string, at least k of the ei’s
are the empty string, and the rest of the di’s and ei’s are the negation sign ¬. Since each
of the Xi’s and Yi’s is a member of C0 and C0 is closed under Boolean operations, each
conjunction (22) is a member of C0, and hence so is the disjunction F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm. But then
K(F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm) ∈ C = MCl(C0). We make use of these facts tacitly in what follows.
Now we have by our assumption (XiIYi)mi=1 and the fact that the Xi’s and Yi’s are subsets
of [w] that every world in [w] is contained in at least as many of the Xi’s as in the Yi’s.
Every world in [w] therefore contains at least one of the Fi’s, for otherwise it would follow
by maximal KB.5-consistency that we could find a world v ∈ [w] that is not contained in
at least as many of the Xi’s as in the Yi’s, a contradiction. By maximal KB.5-consistency,
every world in [w] thereby contains the disjunction F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm. But then it follows
by maximal KB.5-consistency and T-reasoning that K(F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fm) ∈ w, and hence
w ∩M ⊢KB.5 (Xdi IY
d
i )
m
i=1.
Since KB.5 is sound and complete with respect to mid-threshold neighborhood models, we
would expect from Corollary 4.11 that KB.5 is sound and complete with respect to the probability
interpretation for threshold c = 1
2
.
Theorem 5.8 (Due to [Len80]; KB.5 Probability Soundness and Completeness). KB.5 is sound
and complete for threshold 1
2
with respect to the class of epistemic probability models:
∀ϕ ∈ LKB : KB.5 ⊢ ϕ ⇔ |=p ϕ
1
2 .
Proof. Soundness is by Theorems 3.2 and 3.9. Completeness is by Theorem 5.7 and Corol-
lary 4.11.
6 Conclusion
Summary We have provided a study of unary modal logics of high probability. We introduced
epistemic neighborhood models and studied their connection to traditional epistemic probability
models by way of a natural notion of “agreement.” We listed the Lenzen-derivative properties of
epistemic neighborhood models that guarantee the existence of an agreeing probability measure
for threshold c = 1
2
. The list of properties required to guarantee the existence of an agreeing
probability measure for other thresholds is unknown. We also presented our study from a proof
theoretic point of view by introducing a probabilistically sound but incomplete logic KB and our
version of Lenzen’s probabilistically sound and complete logic KB.5 for threshold c = 1
2
. It is
open as to the principles one must add to KB in order to obtain probabilistic completeness for
other thresholds. We also proved soundness and completeness of KB and of KB.5 with respect
to a corresponding class of epistemic neighborhood models. The result for KB.5 along with our
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Theorem 4.10, a theorem we credit to Lenzen, shows thatKB.5 is the logic of probabilistic certainty
and of probability exceeding c = 1
2
. It is our hope that our repackaging of Professor Lenzen’s result
will make his work more accessible to a broad audience of modern modal logicians. We also hope
that the connection we have made with neighborhood semantics will prove useful in future work
on modal logics of qualitative probability.
Open Questions for Future Work
1. The main open question is the following: given a “high-threshold” c ∈ (1
2
, 1) ∩ Q, find the
exact extension KBc of KB that is probabilistically sound and complete for threshold c with
respect to the class of epistemic probability models, in the sense that we would have:
∀ϕ ∈ LKB : KB
c ⊢ ϕ ⇔ |=p ϕc .
Observing that (SC) and (Scott) are not valid for high-thresholds c > 1
2
, we conjecture that
what is required are threshold-specific variants of (SC) and (Scott) that will together guar-
antee probability soundness and completeness. Toward this end, we suggest the following
schemes as a starting point:
(SCs0) (Kˇϕ0 ∧
∧s
i=1 Bˇϕi ∧
∧s
i 6=j=0K(ϕi → ¬ϕj))→ B(
∨s
i=0 ϕi)
(SCs1) (
∧s
i=1 Bˇϕi ∧
∧s
i 6=j=1K(ϕi → ¬ϕj))→ B(
∨s
i=1 ϕi)
(WS) [(ϕiIψi)mi=1 ∧
∧m
i=1Bϕi]→
∨m
i=1Bψi
Observe that (SC) is just (SC10). Further, if we define s′ := c/(1 − c) and s := ceiling(s′),
then scheme (SCs0) is probabilistically sound if s = s′ and scheme (SCs1) is probabilistically
sound if s 6= s′. The reasoning for this is as follows: s′ tells us the number of (1 − c)’s that
divide c. In particular, recall from Lemma 3.5 that the probabilistic interpretation of Bˇϕ is
that ϕ is assigned probability at least 1 − c. Therefore, if we have s disjoint propositions
that each have probability at least 1 − c, then the probability of their disjunction will have
probability s ·(1−c) ≥ c. This inequality is strict if s 6= s′ and is in fact an equality if s = s′.
Therefore, in the case s 6= s′, scheme (SCs1) is sound: s disjoint propositions each having
probability 1− c together sum to a probability exceeding the threshold c. And in case s = s′,
scheme (SCs0) is sound: s disjoint propositions each having probability 1 − c together sum
to a probability that equals c, so adding some additional probability from another disjoint
proposition ϕ0 will yield a disjunction whose probability again exceeds c. In either case,
exceeding probability c is what we equate with belief, so soundness is proved. We note
that scheme (WS) can be shown to be sound by adapting the proof Theorem 3.9(11). The
epistemic neighborhood model versions of (SCs0), (SCs1), and (WS) are:
(scs0) ∀X1, . . . , Xs, Y ⊆ [w]: if [w] − X1, . . . , [w] − Xs /∈ N(w), the Xi’s are pairwise
disjoint, and Y ) ⋃si=1Xi, then Y ∈ N(w).
(scs1) ∀X1, . . . , Xs ⊆ [w]: if [w] − X1, . . . , [w] − Xs /∈ N(w) and the Xi’s are pairwise
disjoint, then ⋃si=1Xi ∈ N(w).
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(ws) ∀m ∈ Z+, ∀X1, . . . , Xm, Y1, . . . , Ym ⊆ [w] :
if X1, . . . , XmIY1, . . . , Ym and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : Xi ∈ N(w) ,
then ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , m} : Yj ∈ N(w) .
If M is an epistemic neighborhood model, then a slight modification of the proof of property
(scott) in Lemma 4.13 shows that M c satisfies (ws). We presume that an adaptation of the
proof for the proof of property (sc) in the same lemma will show that M c satisfies (scs0) if
s = s′ and (scs1) if s 6= s′.
We remark that (WS) is not threshold-specific, though it is sound for all high-thresholds c >
1
2
. We suspect that a threshold-specific variant may be required in order to adapt Lenzen’s
proof of KB.5 probability soundness and completeness for threshold c = 1
2
(Theorem 4.10).
2. Another open question is the exact relationship between Segerberg’s comparitive operator
ϕ  ψ (“ϕ is no more probable than ψ”) [Ga¨r75, Seg71] and our unary operators K and B.
The formula Bϕ is equivalent to ¬ϕ ≺ ϕ. However, it is not clear how the logics of these
operators are related. Also, we suspect that a language with  is strictly more expressive.
3. Yet another direction is the extension of our work to Bayesian updating. Given a pointed
epistemic probability model (M, w) satisfying ϕ, let
M[ϕ] = (W [ϕ], R[ϕ], V [ϕ], P [ϕ])
be defined by
W [ϕ] := JϕKMp
R[ϕ] := R ∩ (W [ϕ]×W [ϕ])
V [ϕ](w) := V (w) for w ∈ W [ϕ]
P [ϕ](w) :=
P (w)
P (JϕKMp )
It is not difficult to see that M[ϕ] is an epistemic probability model and
P [ϕ](X) =
P (X ∩ JϕKMp )
P (JϕKMp )
= P [ϕ](X|JϕKMp ) ,
where the value on the right is the probability of X conditional on JϕKMp . It would be
interesting to investigate the analog of this operation in epistemic neighborhood models.
The operation may also have a close relationship with the study of updates in Probabilistic
Dynamic Epistemic Logic [vBGK09, BS08].
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4. Finally, we have only considered a single-agent version of our logics KB and KB.5. The
reason for this is that obtaining completeness for KB.5 with respect to the class of finite
mid-threshold neighborhood models requires us to construct a finite countermodel satisfying
(sc), as we did in the completeness portion of the proof of Theorem 5.7. However, this prop-
erty has an antecedent that includes the negative condition X ′ /∈ N(w) and from this and
X ( Y ⊆ [w], we are to conclude the positive condition Y ∈ N(w). Referring the reader to
the completeness portions of the proofs of Theorems 5.3 and 5.7 for definitions and termi-
nology, the trick to making things work in the single-agent case is to prove the Definability
Lemma using a particular closure construction that ensures every potential neighborhood
X ⊆ [w] is definable by a formula Xd such that BXd is a member of the closure set C.
This makes crucial use of the In-class Identity Lemma. However, our proof of this lemma
depends on the assumption that maxcons sets u, v ∈ [w] differ only in non-modal formu-
las. In the straightforward multi-agent version of our setting, we would have an equivalence
class [w]a consisting of all maxcons sets that agree on modal formulas Kaϕ and Baψ for a
given agent a. But then two worlds u, v ∈ [w]a could disagree on modal formulas Kbϕ or
Bbψ for some agent b 6= a, which leads to a breakdown in the current proof of the In-class
Identity Lemma and therefore presents problems for guaranteeing definability of potential
neighborhoods satisfying the desired membership property. Remedying this in a multi-agent
version of a finite mid-threshold neighborhood model is not straightforward because it is dif-
ficult to simultaneously satisfy (sc), all other properties of finite mid-threshold neighborhood
models, and the definability-with-membership property. We therefore leave for future work
the matter of proving completeness of multi-agent KB.5 with respect to the class of finite
multi-agent mid-threshold neighborhood models. We note that multi-agent KB.5 is obtained
from our existing axiomatization by simply adding a subscript to all occurrences of a modal
operator K or B in our present axiomatization. Multi-agent KB is obtained similarly, though
completeness for multi-agent KB with respect to the full class of finite multi-agent epis-
temic neighborhood models can be shown without much difficulty because the problematic
property (sc) need not be satisfied.
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